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LEGAL RESPONSES TO RANK-AND-FILE DISSENT:
RESTRICTIONS ON UNION OFFICER AUTONOMY*
PAUL ALAN LEvY**
INTRODUCTION

The labor laws protect the right of workers to criticize or protest the manner in which their unions or employers treat them.
One of the most difficult labor issues facing the courts today is the
extent of the protection afforded by law to union officials who join
their fellow members in such activities. Despite explicit statutory
recognition of the rights of rank-and-fie workers and union members, officers are likely to face loss of their jobs when they exercise
the same rights. Let us consider two examples.
Dave Newman was a Communications Workers shop steward
elected by the framemen at a New York Telephone facility. He initiated a shop newsletter for which he wrote a monthly column. One
column criticized his local's failure to keep in touch with members'
sentiments. Newman also criticized the posture of the local leadership in upcoming contract negotiations. As a result, Newman was
"decertified" by the local leaders, who told New York Telephone
that Newman was no longer to be recognized as a union steward.
Although the union claimed that Newman had been removed because of "insubordination," it became clear during the course of
legal proceedings that the real reason was his exercise of his free
speech rights-indeed, Newman was a model steward who was
enormously popular with his constituents. After two years of litigation and two trips to the Court of Appeals,' Newman was ordered
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1980 Conference of the Association
for Union Democracy, and the 1981 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association. The author is grateful to James Atleson, J. David Edelstein, Stanley Engelstein,
Arthur L. Fox II, Staughton Lynd, Alan B. Morrison, and Dave Newman for their comments
on earlier drafts.
** B.A., Reed College; J.D., University of Chicago Law School. The author, an attorney
at Public Citizen Litigation Group, has represented plaintiffs, charging parties, and amici
curiae in several of the cases cited in this Article.
1. Newman v. Communication Workers Local 1101, No. 77-598 (S.D.N.Y. May 17,
1977) (order granting preliminary injunction), rev'd, 570 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1978), 99
L.R.R.M. 2755 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (order granting permanent injunction), affd, 597 F.2d 833
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reinstated because his removal was found to be a violation of the
free speech rights guaranteed by Title I of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.2
Paul Smith was a driver at the Chelmsford, Massachusetts terminal of the Wilson Freight Company. He was also an elected
steward for Teamsters Local 25. Because he believed that the local
was not doing enough to represent the Wilson workers, Smith frequently sent complaints about Wilson's activities to federal and
state agencies. Wilson fired Smith because, in so doing, he had disregarded the grievance procedure, established by the collective
bargaining agreement as the exclusive means of settling disputes
about working conditions. The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) ordered that Smith be reinstated, 3 concluding that he had
been discharged for exercising rights protected by section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act.4
The Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order.5 It recognized that the NLRA protects the right of employees
to seek redress from government agencies." However, Smith was
deemed unprotected, because the union had agreed both that it
would use the grievance procedure in lieu of other means of protest, and that union stewards would have limited authority which
would not include the filing of complaints with the government.
Because the union had not authorized Smith to file his complaints,
his doing so was not protected by section 7 and Wilson was within
its rights when it fired him.
The legal proceedings initiated by these two workers were conducted under different statutes which largely address different
problems. Newman's case was decided under the LMRDA, which is
directed primarily at internal union practices that inhibit rankand-file control of their organizations.8 Smith, on the other hand,
(2d Cir. 1979).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. The Act is also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, after the
sponsors of the substitute amendment passed on the floor of the House of Representatives
[hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
3. Wilson Freight Co., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 97 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1978).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158 [hereinafter cited as NLRA].
5. N.L.R.B. v. Wilson Freight Co., 604 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
962 (1980).
6. Id. at 724-25, citing Eastex v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
7. 604 F.2d at 725-28.
8. Thus an employer may not be joined as a defendant in a Title I suit, e.g., Parker v.
Teamsters Local 413, 501 F. Supp. 440, 445 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd on other grounds, Nos.
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pursued his case under the National Labor Relations Act. Decisions in recent years have increased the extent to which employees
may hold their unions accountable for unfair internal practices
under the NLRA; 9 nevertheless, section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act is directed principally at relations between the employer and the union
or the employees. 10
Although the two shop stewards invoked different statutes to
protect their activities, both incidents have similar roots. Both
arose from disputes within the union about the manner in which
the collective power of the employees should be used to influence
the employer's decisions about the terms and conditions of employment. Moreover, in both cases a union official was punished
because a higher authority disapproved of the manner in which the
official was promoting the interests, as the official saw it, of his
constituents. And both cases are rooted in the shift of decisionmaking power away from the shop to centralized employer and
union bureaucracies. 1
This Article argues that the common political origin of the two
problems reflected in Smith's and Newman's cases warrants a common legal analysis. First, the role of the lower-level union officer is
discussed and the importance of preserving a measure of autonomy
for these officials as a means of promoting democratic unionism is
stressed. Then the legal basis of the accountability of union officers
to their superiors in the union structure is discussed, under both
the LMRDA and the National Labor Relations Act, in the context
80-2568 and 80-2569 (6th Cir. April 24, 1981), and the involvement of an employer on the
side of the plaintiffs may be grounds for dismissal. Harris v. Plasterers Local 406, 619 F.2d
1164, 1169-70 (7th Cir. 1980).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). Such cases have involved the expanding duty of fair representation, e.g., Teamsters Local 860 v. N.L.R.B., 652 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and the
right to disseminate information critical of the union at the workplace. Helton v. N.L.R.B.,
656 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also N.L.R.B. v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
Indeed, the Board has used § 8(b)(1)(A) to protect against removal of union officers for
filing N.L.R.B. charges. See text & accompanying notes 162-72 infra.
10. Section 8(b)(1)(A) has been held to preserve a wide area of discretion for unions in
regulating their internal affairs. N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
Even where federal labor law applies, it is notoriously difficult in most regions to persuade
the General Counsel to issue a complaint on a union democracy charge by a rank-and-filer
against his union. Because an employee cannot compel the Board to assign an Administrative Law Judge to hear his charges, but must instead rely on the General Counsel's nearly
absolute prosecutorial discretion, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), in practical effect, the union member
has little or no remedy under the NLRA for problems connected with internal union affairs.
11. See text & accompanying notes 14-60 infra.
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of this social and political analysis of the processes of union democracy. The need for protection of officers' rights, and the limitations of those protections pursuant to the union interests legitimated by Congress, are examined. 2 Finally, it is argued that the
essentially internal union nature of disputes like Smith's has been
overlooked in the conventional analysis of the problem, and that
this omission has led some courts to deny legal protection where it
should be available. 13
I.

IMPEDIMENTS TO RANK-AND-FILE CONTROL

The political origins of the conflicts in which both Newman
and Smith were involved may be found in the long-term shift of
decision-making power in both union and management, from the
shop to centralized local, regional, and even national bureaucracies.
This shift, and the response of both union leadership and management to rank-and-file expressions of dissatisfaction with resulting
decisions, have important implications for effective rank-and-file
control in the modern union.1
A.

The Origins of the Union Bureaucracy

Originally, the union was a voluntary association of workers in
individual shops, which in turn became voluntarily allied with each
other.15 The leaders of each shop unit owed an absolute allegiance
to their constituents and were the key personnel in deciding
whether workers would take plant or employer-wide concerted action."8 Unions grew in size as unionists concluded that larger num12. See text & accompanying notes 89-172 infra. See generally Note, Union Members'
Free Speech Guarantee: Does It Protect Against Discharge from Office?, 29 BUFFALO L.
REv. 169 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Union Free Speech]; Note, Reprisal Discharges of
Union Officials, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REP. 274 (1977).
13. See generally Note, Harsher Discipline for Union Stewards than Rank-and-File
for Participationin Illegal Strike Activity: Indiana and MichiganElectric Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
56 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 1175 (1980); Rummage, Union Officers and Wildcat Strikes: Freedom
from DiscriminatoryDiscipline, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 258 (1981).
14. The following is in many respects similar to the analysis in Lipset's seminal article.
See Lipset, The PoliticalProcessIn Trade Unions: A TheoreticalStatement, in LABOR AND
TRADE UNmONISM 216-42 (W. Galenson & S. Lipset eds. 1960).
15. J. KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SEmrLEmEN 130-31 (1961).
16. H. ERICKSON, THE STEwARD's RoLE IN THE UNION 20 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
ERICKSON]; W. LEISERSON, AmERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 291 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as LEISERSON]; I. Hows & B. WmicK, THE UAW AND WAL'TR REUTHER 238 (1949) [hereinafter cited as HowE & WmIcK].
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bers were needed for effective action. 17 As bargaining units grew to
encompass all of a thousand-employee plant, or a whole city, state
or region, it became impossible for the rank-and-file, or even their
immediate representatives, to be directly involved in decision-making.18 Because it was impractical to inform every member of all the
ramifications of decisions made on every issue, or to permit votes
on every issue,1 9 representative union bodies were formed to make

such decisions based on a delegation of power from the rank-and2
file. 0

The loss of decision-making power by union members and
stewards was accelerated by the process of certifying unions as collective bargaining representatives pursuant to section 9 of the
NLRA.2 1 For all practical purposes, the basic contours of the bargaining unit are determined by the union that petitions for representation.22 Moreover, once a group of employees is included in a
larger unit, the NLRB's orientation towards stability in collective
17. These expectations are discussed and challenged by a leading union intellectual in
Brooks, Reflections on the Changing Characterof American Labor Unions, in UNIONS AND
UNION LEADERSHIP 27, 29-30 (J. Barbash ed. 1959). The author found in recent discussions
with unionists in New Zealand that they are in the process of a soul-searching debate about
the benefits and costs-including loss of democracy-inherent in the possible consolidation
of unions that have traditionally been quite small in that country.
18. J. BARBASH, AMERICAN UNIONS: STRucTuRE, GOVERNMENT AND PoLmcs 72 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as BARBASH]; R. LESTER, As UNIONS MATURE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLU-

TION OF AMERICAN UNIONISM 23-25 (1958) [hereinafter cited as LEsTER]. This account is most
directly relevant to industrial unions and others engaged in bargaining with large-scale employers or employer associations. Craft unions experienced similar developments, although
with less complete loss of local autonomy. See generally L. ULMAN, THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL UNION (1955).

19. Although some unions have permitted referenda on major issues, the experience has
been judged largely unsatisfactory. See, e.g., M. HoRowrrz, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE CARPENTERS UNION 11-17 (1962); L. ULMAN, supra note 18, at 299. One of the
grounds for this dissatisfaction has been the low level of participation in referenda, as compared to representative conventions. Curiously, however, inspection of tables in HoRowrrz,
supra, which show the levels of participation in referenda and conventions, suggests that the
extent of membership involvement in selecting convention representatives may have been
much smaller than in voting on referenda. Compare p. 13 (1998 locals sent in votes in 1957
referendum) with p. 17 (1021 locals represented in 1958 convention).
20. Herberg, Bureaucracy and Democracy in Labor Unions, 3 ANTIOCH REV. 405, 408
(1943). In most unions, use of the referendum is confined to ratification of contracts, and
sometimes votes on proposed mergers. Many unions do not submit even these basic issues to
membership vote, except at officer-controlled meetings.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 159.
22. Hall, The AppropriateBargaining Unit: Striking a Balance Between Stable Labor
Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 479, 531 (1967).
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bargaining makes it very difficult for that group to be released
from the unit.2" The certified union is the exclusive representative
of all employees in all the shops it represents and the shop leaders,
as well as the informal shop organizations, lose legitimacy as they
are united and legally subordinated to the union. This central
bargaining representative is authorized to trade away each shop's
right to strike, seniority rights, hiring and firing procedures, wage
or piece rates and all other terms and conditions of employment in
the common interests of all the shops and subunits in the union. 5
Despite the transfer of the power to negotiate contracts away
from the shop floor, shop and local leaders retained at first a critical role in decision-making.2 6 Even while contracts were being negotiated by the nascent bureaucracies, the local leadership maintained control of the grievance procedure. Although the grievance
procedure is often idealized by the courts as a quasi-judicial process, 2 7 social science analysis recognizes it as simply an additional

forum for the exercise of power.2
This power shift, however, did not stop with the mere creation
of competing centers of power. Both unions and management
found their subordinates making concessions or demands that were
inconsistent with broader policies.29 Therefore, to keep control,
both sides removed effective decision-making authority from steward and foreman and gave them to union leaders and industrial
relations officers.30
23. Id. at 532; Sharp, Craft Certification:New Expansion of an Old Concept, 33 OHIO
ST. L.J. 102, 105-06 (1972).
24. BARBASH, supra note 18, at 48; ERICKSON, supra note 16, at 25; LEISERSON, supra
note 16, at 291. See also Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Cmnty. Org., 420 U.S.
50 (1977).
25. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1966).

26. R. MILLER, F. ZELLER & G. MILLER, THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL UNION LEADERSHIP 14647 (1965) [hereinafter cited as MILLER, ZELLER & MILLER].
27. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579-85 (1960).

28. See generally J. KUHN, supra note 15.
29. The process by which managers sought increasingly to exercise control over foremen
in order to ensure that they used their power over workers in the interest of the employer,
and the consequent destruction of the authority of shop floor supervisors, is well described
in R. EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN (1979).
30. D. BEELER & H. KURSHENBAUM, HOW TO BE A MORE EFFECTIVE UNION REPRESENTATI E 19-21 (1965); HowE & WIDICK, supra note 16, at 240; L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, THE
LOCAL UNION: ITS PLACE IN THE INDUSTRIAL PLANT 35-39 (1953). Some centralization of
power was also due to the growth of checkoffs, the process where the employer automatically withholds membership dues and transmits them directly to the union. When job stew-
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Naturally, as the number and complexity of decisions increased, it became impossible for everything to be done by rankand-file workers who were elected to sit part-time on their union's
executive board. Thus, some workers had to be separated from the
plant and given full-time responsibilities doing nothing but union
business.3 1. They, in turn, ultimately hired specialists among whom
the union's various administrative tasks could be divided.32 The
opportunities for rank-and-fie supervision and evaluation of officers' performance decreased. Concomitantly, union functionaries' loyalties to the leaders who were actually making decisions
increased, and the leadership took on all the characteristics of a
political machine.34
ards were responsible for collecting dues from the members individually, both they and the
central leadership were, perforce, more attuned to mass sentiments which could be delivered
along with the money. See B. WIDIcK, LABOR TODAY: THE TRIUMPHS AND FAILUR S OF
UNIONISM IN THE UNrrED STATES 85 (1964) [hereinafter cited as WmICK]; HOWE & WmiCK,
supra note 16, at 236. Recent decisions indicate that the level of dues may be set at the
international level, without a vote by the membership. Mori v. Boilermakers, 653 F.2d 1267
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3535 (1982).
31. Herberg, supra note 20, at 408.
32. Brooks, supra note 17, at 27, 32-34; Herberg, supranote 20, at 410-11. Resistance to
creation of a large national staff in the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers is the product of
both recognition of the extent to which the staff hampers rank-and-file control, and of the
opposition to centralized power in the union. M. ROTHAUM, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE OIL,
CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS UNION 108-09 (1962) [hereinafter cited as ROTHBAUM].
33. MILLER, ZELLER & MILLER, supra note 26, at 150-52, 175-76, 190-92; LESTER, supra
note 18, at 23-25; HOWE & WIDICK, supranote 16, at 252-53. This difficulty is accentuated at
the local level when the union either does not have its own full-time employees, relying
instead on international representatives. See, e.g., J. HEELING, RIGHT TO CHALLENGE: PEOPLE
AND POWER IN THE STEELWORKERS UNION 120 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HERLING]; L.
SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 30, at 249-50, or hires a business representative whose
salary is paid in part by the international. See, e.g., M. PERLMAN, DEMOCRACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 89 (1962) [hereinafter cited as PERLMAN].
34. LESTER, supra note 18, at 26-27; S. LEsET, M. Thow & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY 147-48 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Li'sET, TRow & COLEMAN]; PROD, TEAMSTER DEMOCRACY AND FINANCIAL RESPONSmLrrY 1-45 (1976); Herberg, supra note 20. Many democratic forms are maintained, but assume primarily ritualistic functions. Thus, for example,
although at conventions officers make reports which must then be "accepted" and resolutions as well as officer selections are put to a vote, the votes are unanimous-which suggests
that the real decisions are being made in some other forum. Coleman, Compulsive Pressures
of Democracy in Unionism, 61 Am. J. Soc. 519, 524 (1956); Seidman, Emergence of Concern
with Union Government and Administration in ESTEY, TAFT & WAGNER, REGULATING
UNION GOVERNMENT 1, 11-12 (1964). This process actually weakens unions by hampering the
development of new leaders. Soffer, Collective Bargainingand FederalRegulation of Union
Government in ESTEY, TAFT & WAGNER, supra, at 91, 120, 122.
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B. Insulation of the Bureaucraciesfrom Democratic Control
There are, however, crucial differences between political machines in state and local government and those in unions. Perhaps
the most important difference is that the two-party system is the
exception, rather than the rule, in unions.s5 Particularly during the
period before the Wagner Act permitted one union to become the
representative of all workers in a plant by majority rule, unions
frequently faced efforts by some of their own members to shift
workers' loyalties to another union, often weakening the workers'
struggle against the employer in the process. Against this background and the resultant union suspicion of factionalism, attempts
to organize persistent opposition caucuses tend to be considered, at
best, a hindrance to unity in battle against the employer, and at
worst, a manifestation of "dual unionism. ' ' s
Several other factors contribute to the inhibition of persistent
internal caucuses analogous to political parties. For example, there
is no regular means of communication with the union membership,
except the union newspaper which is normally run by and in the
interest of the incumbents. The leadership may, by coverage of the
issues facing the union in a manner which reflects their own biases,
create membership acceptance of those biases. 87 There are some
limits on the extent to which a union newspaper may provide election coverage biased in favor of the incumbents, but the courts
have tightly restricted this limitation to the campaign period.,
This prevents an insurgent group from placing its views before the
membership on a regular basis, thereby gaining legitimacy.
Although members do have a right of access to the membership list to do mailings at their own expense on particular issues,ss
35. LEsTER, supra note 18, at 53; Summers, Union Democracy in a One-Party Structure, 21 UNIoN DEMOCRACY Rnv. 2 (1981). The best-known exception is the International
Typographers Union, whose experience is considered at length in Ln'snr, TRow & COLEMAN,
supra note 34.
36. W. GALENSON, TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE 88 (1961); J. SEIDMAN,
J. LONDON, B. KARSH & D. TAGLIACOZZO, THE WORKER ViEws His UNION 209-11 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as SEIDMAN & LONDON].
37. Jacobs & Spring, Fair Coverage in Internal Union Periodicals, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J.
204, 206-15 (1981).
38. The limits are based on Title IV of the LMRDA, which forbids union dissemination
of campaign literature for a candidate for union office. Camarata v. Teamsters, 478 F. Supp.
321, 330 (D.D.C. 1979); Yablonski v. UMW, 305 F. Supp. 868 (D.D.C. 1969), amended, 305
F. Supp. 876 (1969).
39. See, e.g., BRAC Lodge 1380 v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1980); Sheldon v.
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the prohibitive costs involved make it impractical to send such
mailings on a regular basis. Similarly, although members have a
right of access to contracts, from which the addresses of employees
may be determined in order to take a campaign to the plant gate,'0
only a sophisticated organization with enormous resources of personnel-in effect, a parallel job steward structure-could do so on
a continuing basis.
Another factor inhibiting insurgents is that centralization of
power makes it difficult for a faction to control one region while
out of power in the union as a whole.' 1 In most unions, even the
executive board is elected at large, so that each of the members
depends on the rest of the board-and in practice, the president-for inclusion on the slate which will be presented by the incumbents for election. 2 Moreover, the power of the central officers
makes it inconvenient at best for a region to be represented by an
oppositionist who cannot make deals for the region's benefit. Thus,
whether or not the executive board is chosen at large or by districts or trades, if some regional posts are held by an opposition
group in the wake of a contest over national offices, the opposition
officers normally join the administration or face defeat in a subsequent election.' 8
The growing need for specialized personnel in union administration further inhibits rank-and-file insurgencies, especially persistent caucuses. Absent access to the same kind of specialists who
serve the incumbents, insurgents are hard-put to assemble a persuasively reasoned program of opposition that addresses the many
sophisticated problems which unions face. 44 There are no union
O'Callaghan, 497 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally Levy, Trends in Federal Courts,
21 UNION DEMOCRACY REV. 10 (1981). See also 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1976) (candidate for
union office may send mailings at own expense).
40. Colpo v. Teamsters Local 326, 512 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Del. 1981).
41. See, e.g., M. HOROWITZ, supra note 19, at 35-36.
42. Gamm, The Election Base of National Union Executive Boards, 32 IND. & LAB.
REL. REV. 295, 298-304 (1979).
43. See, e.g., HERLING, supra note 33, at 49-50, 370; J. STEBER, GOVERNING TM UAW
63-66, 148-49 (1962) [hereinafter cited as STEDER]. In the Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill
Workers, the western region was the strongest source of opposition over an extended period
of time. After it became clear that the union leadership would either remove or supplant
any western leaders who reflected rank-and-file opposition, the region had no choice but to
withdraw and form the Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers. 14 UNION DEMOCRACY IN ACTION 1-3 (1965). See generally H. GRAHAM, THE PAPER REBELLION (1970).
44. HERLING, supra note 33, at 42-43; id. at 161-62.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

equivalents of such organizations as the Brookings Institution or
Hoover Institute which are available on a continuing basis to serve

Democrats and Republicans when out of power;' 5 nor would there

be money to pay for such services even if there were numerous
outside consulting services willing to risk their regular clients' business by working for insurgent groups.," Moreover, members are

unlikely to support a candidate for union office whose experience is
solely in the shop, whom they therefore have been unable to observe and evaluate in the performance of administrative and executive functions.47 Nor do defeated union officers frequently return
to their old jobs, where they could provide experienced leadership
or a source of credible dissenting analysis to a nascent opposition
4

group. 8

Another difference between the state and union political machines is that union constitutions, for the most part, lack the
"checks and balances" which restrict centralization of power. 4 9 Of
course, American constitutions were also written before the rise of
bureaucratic government, but the party system and the creation of
autonomous branches and levels of government have facilitated
constant struggle to maintain popular control.5 0 Union rules, how45. The Association for Union Democracy provides aid to union dissidents, but confines
its assistance to issues of free speech, fair elections and union decisionmaking processes. It
deliberately eschews involvement in programmatic debates.
46. Recent years have seen the development of public relations and consulting firms
specializing in union affairs. These organizations have thus far been either closely affiliated
with union general counsel's offices (e.g., Kamber Associates) or bound by union traditions.
Their close affiliation with the unions and the lack of funds from outside sources have led
the organizations to serve the incumbent leaders. Eventually, however, such outside organizations may become available to substantial factions within the official families of unions
and thus encourage electoral contests.
47. A. COOK, UNION DEMOCRACY: PRACTICE AND IDEAL 206-07 (1963).
48. Seidman, Requirements of Union Democracy,81 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 255-56 (1958).
Shop floor leaders also play an important role in facilitating communication among the
workers, which is a precondition for internal activism and thus for rank-and-file control. See
Gordon, The Best Defense is a Good Offense, in NEw DIRECTIONS INLABOR ECONOMICS AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 198-99 (M. Carter & W. Lehay eds. 1981).
49. BARBASH, supra note 18, at 72-75; Herberg, supra note 20, at 410. At one time,
widespread union-busting attitudes among employers, and the prospect of raids by rival
unions, created an extra check on centralizing tendencies. These countervailing forces have
substantially diminished. Brooks, supra note 17, at 28-29.
50. See generally R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND
CONSENT (1967). McConnell observes that the governing structures of unions were organized
on theories of democracy which looked to simple majority rule, as opposed to the more
complicated theories upon which American governments were organized. McConnell, Factionalism and Union Democracy, 9 LAB. L.J. 635, 636-37 (1958).
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ever, avoided the creation of internal centers of independent power
which could, even without opposition parties, restrict each others'
activities and growth by dint of institutional "territoriality."51
Union experimentation with means of maintaining rank-and-file
control over executive officers by creating truly independent power
centers has often been frustrated by the conclusion that the costs
in administrative efficiency were too high.52 Nor is there any institutionalized forum for debate among opposing factions. Union government consists primarily of an executive branch, to which the
legislative branch (the convention and executive board) is politically, if not legally, subordinate. 53
Unionists are very self-conscious of the need to maintain a
centralized decision-making structure in order to be able to do battle with the employer." Indeed, the analogy to an army and wartime conditions is common in union self-characterization. 5 Thus,
although there is some evidence that unions which participate in
more aggressive struggles against employers are by and large the
most democratic, 6 most union leaders would criticize the view advanced by Lipset and others, that a two-party system is almost a
necessary component for democratic unionism, on the ground that
the union which he studied, the International Typographers
Union, is atypical both in its traditions and structures and in its
mild collective bargaining environment.5
51. The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers experimented with such formal independence of functions, but ultimately rejected it. ROTHEAUM, supra note 32, at 89-98. The centralized power to assign subordinates, even elected subordinates, has frequently been used
to eliminate opposition or render it ineffective. See, e.g., Cefalo v. UMWA District 50, 311 F.
Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1970); Perlman, supra note 33, at 72-73.
52. See, e.g., ROTHBAUM, supra note 32, at 77-78, 97-98.
53.

See, e.g., L. BROMWICH, UNION CONsTrruTIONS 9-21 (1959); PROD, supra note 34, at

13-19, 31-39.
54. STIEBER, supra note 43, at 164, 169-70; Soffer, supra note 34, at 97.
55. See, e.g., WmicK, supra note 30, at 76-77 (quoting Arthur Goldberg); Muste, Factional Fights in Trade Unions in AMEaICA LABOR DYNAMics 332-33 (Hardman ed. 1928).
56. HOWE & WmicK, supra note 16, at 245; L. SAYLES & G. STRAuss, supra note-30, at

255-57.
57. Compare LPsET, TROw & COLEMAN, supra note 34 with C. KERR, UNION LFADERs
OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING 7-8 (1958); Segal, Efforts at Democratic Union Participation,81

MONTHLY LAB. REV. 253, 254 (1958). Fisher and McConnell respond that although the ITU's

relations with employers have been relatively peaceful-the employers have accepted it as a
bargaining partner and have not sought to destroy it-the union has been aggressive and at
the forefront of the labor movement in some struggles. Fisher & McConnell, Internal Conflict and Labor Union Solidarity, in INDusTRAL ComarcT 135-36 (Kornhauser ed. 1954).
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Consequently, political struggles over higher level union offices
rarely occur, and when they do, they are generally contests between incumbent officers within the official family.58 A rank-andfiler does not have an opportunity to perform in office and thus to
prove his worth, without becoming part of the incumbent administration;5 9 yet one who does not already hold office is almost never
elected to a responsible union position.6 0 Moreover, the ability to
wage an effective campaign depends on support from some incumbent officers whose power gives them access to money and campaign workers. 1 Indeed, in many unions, the conventions are dominated by hundreds of union staff members elected as delegates,
who give the leadership yet another advantage in controlling the
62
decisions made there.
Although access to local union office is somewhat less restricted,63 many of the same problems manifest themselves at this
level, even if in a lesser degree." The tendency is particularly pro58. See, e.g., HERLING, supra note'33, at 365.
59. See note 47 supra.
60. Arnold Miller's election as President of the United Mine Workers was so exceptional that it drew extensive comments about that very fact. See, e.g., J. EDELSTEIN & M.
WARNER, COMPARATIVE UNION DEMOCRACY 319 (1979) [hereinafter cited as EDELSTEIN &
WARNER]. Yet even that election was made possible only by the earlier candidacy of Jock
Yablonski, a prominent official in the union, whose victory was stolen in a rigged election
and whose political murder was then initiated by the incumbent leader, Anthony Boyle.
These unusual events aroused sufficient attention from the press to permit circumvention of
the normal obstacles to union-wide communication, and helped the Miller candidacy attract
assistance from the political establishment, in the form of legal help and close Labor Department scrutiny of the election. Victory would have been impossible without these circumstances. See James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in
National Union Elections, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 247, 326-40 (1978).
61. See, e.g., PERLMAN, supra note 33, at 68; STIEER, supra note 43, at 72-73, 156. A
national union leader has lost a fair election only when such support was available. See, e.g.,
HERLING,

supra note 33.

62. James, supra note 60, at 262. For this reason, the Oil Workers International Union
forbade staff members to become delegates. ROTHBAUM, supra note 32, at 55-56. Similarly,
in the Warsaw region, Solidarnosc, the Polish independent trade union, limited participation at the convention by full-time union staff at any level of the union to half of the delegates. However, internal union "Hatch Acts" are extremely rare.
63. Seidman, supra note 34, at 11.
64. Soffer, supra note 34, at 114. Thus, access to local office usually requires service as a
steward first. See LEISERSON, supra note 16, at 302. Subsequent promotion to a given union
office is normally from the next lower union office. See Ln'sET, TRow, & COLEMAN, supra
note 34, at 148. See also Newman v. CWA Local 1101, 99 L.R.R.M. 2755, 2762 (1978) (no
officer was ever elected who did not first serve as a steward). Alternately, in many unions an
appointment to a position such as international representative, organizer or trustee is the
normal steppingstone to higher elected offices.
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nounced in larger locals and in locals with full-time union officers
who are paid by the union rather than working for a living in the
shop."5 As one ascends the union hierarchy, the forces of incumbency and one-party rule increase and officials are less and less
accountable to the membership because they are more removed
from, and less visible to, the rank-and-file66
C. Divergence of Bureaucratic and Rank-and-File Perspectives
The shift in power and loss of accountability are accompanied
by a divergence between the class nature-and thus the class interests-of the members and their leaders.6 7 Union leaders have more
stimulating, less repetitive jobs than the members; they are salaried, not hourly workers; they work in offices, not noisy and unhealthy plants; 8 they also tend to be chosen from among the high
status workers.6 Differences in social attitudes are inevitable.70
The leadership-and therefore the unions which they control-are
in grave danger of losing touch with the desires and aspirations of
the membership particularly as, in higher parts of the union structure, officers rarely even speak to ordinary members except in
highly artificial circumstances.71 It is from officers lower in the hierarchy, who are more directly in contact with the rank-and-file,
that membership attitudes must be obtained, if at all.
This loss of contact becomes especially serious because the upward shift in power, caused by the need for centralization in the
common interest, does not change the fact that different groups of
65.
66.

& LONDON, supra note 36, at 168-69.
L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 30, at 240-44; WIDICK, supra note 30, at 90-91;
SEIDMAN

Seidman, supra note 34, at 13-14. See also Seidman, Democracy in Labor Unions, 61 J.
POL. ECON. 221 (1953).
67. Brenner, A New Social Democracy?, 1 AGAINST

THE

CURRENT 7, 9-10 (1980); Lipset,

supra note 14, at 221-25; Muste, supra note 55, at 341-43.
68. WIDIcK, supra note 30, at 78, 81-82.
69. L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 30, at 143-50; SEIDMAN & LONDON, supra note
36, at 170-71.
70.

LESTER, supra note 18, at 26-27, 109-10; A. NASH, THE UNION STEWARD: DUTIES,

STATUS 41-43, (1977); Brenner, supra note 67, at 9.
71. HOWE & WIDICK, supra note 16, at 248; L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 30, at
241-46; Herberg, supra note 20, at 411. Although several unions experimented early in their
histories with "rank and file" executive boards, boards composed of union members who
were still employed in the industry that would supervise the performance of the full-time
officers, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers is the only substantial national union to
retain this feature. See L. ULMAN, supra note 18, at 289-90, 296. See also ROTHEAUM, supra
note 32, at 77-78.
RIGHTS AND
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union members may have very different needs and interests, which
often may be in conflict.72 Many decisions the union makes-such
as to press or concede a particular grievance, or to adopt or reject a
particular clause in the contract-necessarily advance the interests
of some groups while endangering the interests of others.7 3 The
union needs some way of determining how intensely its constituent
parts feel about particular matters and of accommodating these
conflicting impulses in such a way as to minimize the damage done
to the allegiance paid by the various groups of members to the
union as a whole. Such damage may ultimately affect their willingness to engage in concerted action to advance the collective interests of the membership as a whole,74 or even, in extreme cases, to
remain a part of the union. 5
Lower-level union officers, particularly those like stewards,
grievance committee members, and some executive board members, who remain full-time employees in the bargaining unit and
do their union work after hours, play a critical role in the process
by which the union makes these determinations.76 As noted previously, their full-time, on-the-job relationships make them both
more credible with the other workers and enable them to reflect for
the union leadership, far more accurately than full-time union employees such as business agents, the sentiments of the rank-andfile. And it is important that these determinations be made accurately, not only from the point of view of their constituents-who
depend on the lower-level officers to represent their interests in
central decision-making 7 -but also from the point of view of the
72.

See generally J. KUHN, supra note 15; L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 30, at

43-58.
73. Dunlop, Structural Changes in the American Labor Movement, in LABOR AND
TRADE UNIONISM 102-09 (W. Galenson & S. Lipset eds. 1960).
74. ERICKSON, supra note 16, at 33-34; J. KUHN, supra note 15, at 82, 144, 179, 185; S.
PECK, THE RANK AND FILE LEADER 33 (1963); L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 30, at 37,
100. The alienation of leadership from the rank-and-file may also reduce union member-

ships because it makes it more difficult for the union to withstand intense employer opposition in organizing or decertification campaigns. Compa, Back to Basics for the Labor Movement, 8 WORKING PAPERS 12, 15-16 (1981).
75. For example, the continuing refusal of the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers to respect the interests of its western members during collective bargaining negotiations led to the withdrawal of those who were able to join to form
separate bargaining units. Gamin, supra note 42, at 305-06; UNION DEMOCRACY IN ACTION
No. 14, at 1-3. See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 43, at 120-57.
76. Strauss & Sayles, The Unpaid Local Leader, 30 HARV. BUS. REV. 91 (1952).
77. A. COOK, supra note 47, at 236; see also HOWE & WIDICK, supra note 16, at 119, 236.

1981]

RANK-AND-FILE DISSENT

677

membership as a whole, whose success depends upon continued
cohesion.8

D. Impact of Internal Political Conflict on the Workplace
In the normal course of events, the process of determining how
various parts of the union membership wish to react to given employer policies, and the resolution of any resulting disputes about
whether and how hard the union should be pressing which grievances, remains strictly a question of internal union policies, as in
Newman's case. Sometimes, however, the effects spill over into the
workplace and the employer may become directly involved. This is
particularly likely to happen when, for reasons just discussed, the
union itself has been unable or unwilling to communicate employee
dissatisfaction to the employer. 9 In Smith's case, the employer
was implicated because complaints against it were submitted to
state and federal agencies. More commonly, the employees may
participate in concerted refusals to work-wildcat strikes-or
other job actions."'
The employer, of course, suffers injury from such activities,
particularly when production is interrupted. The union, too, is severely endangered by such outbreaks. In collective bargaining the
union represents to the employer that it has the loyalty of the various subgroups that constitute the bargaining unit. 1 Indeed, the
employer is forbidden by law to bargain with any other representative of the workers in the bargaining unit."2 When groups of workers take their own initiatives and deal directly with the employer,
they challenge the integrity of the union and threaten its overall
collective bargaining strategy.8 Not only may the workers force a
78.

J. KUHN, supra note 15, at 109-10; L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 30, at 47-48.
79. Atleson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 750, 768-69
(1972).
80. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 101 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1979),
enforced, Nos. 79-1707 and 79-1862 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 5, 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3954

(1981).
81. L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 30, at 65-66; Atleson, supra note 79, at 762-63
(1973).
82. Section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
83. J. KUHN, supra note 15, at 82, 168, 179; Sayles, Wildcat Strikes, 32 HAV. Bus. REv.
42, 46 (1954). See also Williams, The PoliticalLiberties of Labor Union Members, 32 TEx.
L. REv. 826, 831 (1954) (classifying wildcatting with strike-breaking and working below scale
as "acts of treason" which "destroy the union"). Cf. Lynd, Right to Engage in Concerted
Activity After Union Recognition: A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 720 (1975)
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bargain which directly conflicts with the union's strategy, but any
costs incurred in responding to the contractually forbidden action
or in compensating for lost production inevitably increase total labor costs, thus decreasing the amount available in bargaining with
the union."'
The threat to the union, however, is complicated by the fact
that unauthorized concerted activities arise when the members believe either that the union does not recognize their concerns as important, or that for some other reason the union is unwilling to
fight for their own peculiar interests.88 Thus, if leaders respond to
the unauthorized activity too forcefully, they run the risk that the
workers will conclude that the union is just siding with management.8 6 The leadership, therefore, informed by their union experience and influence, must walk the narrow line between allowing
the rank-and-file explosion to destroy the union's credibility with
management, and stamping down on the dissidents so hard that
the overall unity of the workers is destroyed, leaving no more than
87
a conglomeration of ad hoc leaders.

In summary, under conditions of centralization of power and
authority, as exist in modern American unions, members may face
very substantial obstacles that prevent them from ensuring real
consideration of their views and interests. Officials at lower levels
of the union hierarchy are often the most likely to share members'
outlook, or at least to be able to present their views at the decision-making levels of the union. Accordingly, insofar as officers are
encouraged to perform the internal union function of promoting
dissenting views and interests, or punished for doing so, the membership is aided or hindered in maintaining some measure of con(employees have right to present grievances to employer even in opposition to the union).

84. Sayles, supra note 83. Many supervisors believe that any unauthorized activity is
really the product of union leadership even if no evidence of union involvement exists. Management usually attributes the lack of evidence to the union cleverly covering its tracks.
Atleson, supra note 79, at 811-12. This view is contrary to the conclusions reached by more
dispassionate observers. See Sayles, supra note 83. It is also illogical in light of the eventual
cost to the bargaining unit as a whole. In any event, this Article considers only the impact of
"truly" unauthorized activity.
85. See, e.g., WIDICK, supra note 30, at 65; Atleson, supra note 79, at 758, 763-64;
Flood, Some New Reflections on Wildcat Strikes, 1 SUMMATION 1, 4, 8-9 (1968).
86. J. BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN ACTION 127 (1948); Sayles, supra note 83, at 44, 50.
87. J. KUHN, supra note 15, 83, 147-48; L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 30, at 248;
Atleson, supra note 79, at 762.
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trol over their union."8

As discussed in Part II, the law can protect the right to criticize the existing program or officers, and seek to change them,
without creating the autonomous power centers-giving each officer the right to act as he sees fit-that unions have so carefully
avoided because that could prevent efficient union administration.
Finally, when membership discontent with the union's collective
decisions spills over into confrontations with the employer, it is
once again the lower level union officers who are faced with the
most delicate tasks of retaining the members' loyalty, while maintaining the union's overall unity. Part III explores the law's response to this conflict.
II. LEGAL PROTECTION FOR OFFICERS' DISSENT

A.

Origins of the LMRDA

The union movement originated in the desire of workers to
participate in decisions about that significant portion of their waking lives spent at work. From sporadic and spontaneous worker resistance to the increasingly sophisticated ways that employers
sought to control their work lives, workers developed institutions
through which they could exert their collective power and assert
their own interests.89 Social acceptance of workers' rights to act in
concert and to build such institutions achieved enduring status in
the 1930's with the passage of the National Industrial Recovery
Act 90 and the National Labor Relations Act. 91 The rise of industrial unions and the competitive growth of the rival American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations
made the phenomenon of mass unionism a permanent feature of
88. Studies of union democracy have frequently concluded that the existence of independent power centers is the key structural characteristic that may allow democracy to
flourish in one-party unions. See, e.g., EDELSTEIN & WARNER, supra note 60, at 319; PERLMAN, supra note 33, at 101-02; Herberg, supra note 20, at 415-16. In the Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers, for example, decentralization and subordinate staff autonomy have been
the principal structural means which union reformers have used to prevent the insulation of
central officers from the rank-and-file. See ROTHBAUM, supra note 32, at 63.
89. A sharp account of this continuing struggle for control and of the ways which unions often aid the employers instead of their members, is found in R. EDWARDS, supra note
29.
90. 48 Stat. 195 (June 30, 1933) U.S.C.
91. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964)).
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life in most parts of the country.2
As early as the 1940's, however, commentators noted that
workers' instruments of industrial democracy failed to observe basic democratic norms.9 In the late 1940's and 1950's individuals
normally allied with the labor movement published studies suggesting that in a substantial number of unions internal pressures
and existing common law protections were not sufficient to guarantee democratic rights. Many national union leaders recognized
the problem-at least in the abstract. But despite the fanfare accompanying the establishment of an Ethical Practices Code in connection with the AFL-CIO merger, the labor movement proved unable to compel even the most flagrantly undemocratic unions to
clean up their own houses.9
An unusual coalition between labor's supporters and enemies,

aided by the revelations of the McClellan Committee, 6 rallied to
support a legal charter for democratic unionism as a part of the

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.9 7 Labor's enemies apparently believed that union democracy would make the
leadership stop forcing unwilling members out on strike.98 The
92. WIDICK, supra note 30, at 33-34.
93. In 1943, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union issued the first of a series
of studies and declarations which called for greater implementation of the protections
granted to general society in the union context. See AM. Civ. LIB. UN., DEMOCRACY IN TRADE
UNIONS (1943).
94. See, e.g., L. BROMWICH, UNION CONSTITUTIONS (1959); C. SUMMERS, DEMOCRACY IN
LABOR UNIONS (1952); Summers, The Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy, 48
AM. ECON. REV. 44 (1958).
95. See generally, SENATE SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR OR
MANAGEMENT FIELD (MCCLELLAN COMMITTEE), INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 1414, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM REPORT]. See also 42 UNION DEMOCRACY
IN ACTION 4 (1972).
96. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 95.
97. 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1959).
98. This belief was frequently expressed on the floor of Congress by many of the most
rigid supporters of strong union democracy provisions. See, e.g., II N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, 1959, at 1215-17,
1293 (1959) [hereinafter cited as I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY or II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. See also
James, supra note 60, at 260. Others, however, had cautioned that employers who demanded
more democractic unions might get more trouble, not less. See, e.g., Hays, The Union and
Its Members: The Uses of Democracy, in 11TH ANN. NEW YORK U. CONF. ON LABOR (1958).
Indeed, some conservative business and political leaders now support repeal of the Landrum-Griffin Act on the theory that legal protections for democratic rights in unions are
used primarily by "radical union leaders." HERITAGE FOUNDATION, MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP
POLICY MANAGEMENT IN A CONSERVATE ADMINISTRATION 468 (1981).
On the other hand, there is no evidence to support the contention, sometimes raised
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leadership of the AFL-CIO, although vehemently opposed to legal
limitations on their powers, were hampered by their recognition of
the problems exposed by the McClellan Committee, as well as by
the labor movement's ideological commitment to realizing democratic norms. 99 Moreover, AFL-CIO lobbyists overestimated their
strength in the legislative battles and thereby lost the opportunity
to make compromises that would have imposed less stringent government regulation. 100 Nevertheless, some portions of the bill, such
as Title I, the Union Members' Bill of Rights,10 1 which could be
enforced by union members directly through the courts, were
pushed through by floor amendments which often passed by the
narrowest of margins. 102
today by union bureaucrats and intellectuals, that management promoted the LandrumGriffin Act as a cynical effort to weaken unions by encouraging militants in foolhardy ventures. The only references to such prospects appeared in the statements of opponents of the
Act. See, e.g., II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 1623 (Rep. Teller).
99. Remarks of George Meany at a June 7, 1957 conference of the Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO, reprinted in 23 UNION DEMOcRAcY REV. 8 (1981). See also STIEBER,
supra note 43, at 159; Coleman, The Compulsive Pressures of Democracy in Unionism, 61
Am. J. Soc. 519 (1956). For a fine account of the conflicting pressures and concomitant leadership vacillation see Benson, The Quest for Union Democracy and Reform, 15 UNION DEMOCRACY REV. 3 (1978).
100. See generally McADAms, POWER AND POLITICS INLABOR LEGISLATION (1964). The
differing views within the federation about what compromises, if any, would be tolerable
also hampered the AFL-CIO's opposition. Id.
101. Section 101 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411, enumerates the rights of members.
Other provisions of Title I concern enforcement, 29 U.S.C. § 412, preservation of existing
membership rights, 29 U.S.C. § 413, access to collective bargaining agreements, 29 U.S.C. §
414, and union distribution of information about the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 415.
102. S. REP. No. 1555, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) was reported in 1959 by the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, but like the Kennedy-Ives bill, S. REP. No. 3974,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), which passed the Senate in 1958 and died in the House, it
lacked a Bill of Rights. Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union
Members, 45 MINN. L. REV. 199, 204-05 (1960). Senator McClellan offered on the floor his
own Bill of Rights, II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 1102, which was passed by a
single vote. Id. at 1119. Three days later a modified version sponsored by Senator Kuchel
was substituted by a large margin. Id. at 1239. The House Committee on Education and
Labor then reported a new version of the original Senate Report No. 1555 in H. R. REP. No.
8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 687. A few
members thought the committee bill too intrusive into the legitimate decisions of unions,
and introduced the Shelley bill, H. R. REP. No. 8490, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), id. at 865,
which was defeated by a vote of 245 to 132. Other members who thought H.R. Rep. No.
8342 too weak offered the Landrum-Griffin substitute, H. R. REP. No. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959), id. at 619, which passed 229 to 201 by the recorded vote, II LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 98, at 1691-92, and 215 to 200 by a teller vote moments before. A. McADAMS, supra note 100, at 231. The conference later adopted the House version of the Bill of
Rights. I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 935.
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The question of whether members who serve as union officers
are covered by Title I protections received scant attention in the
Congress. Accordingly, there is little in the legislative history that
relates directly to the extent of protection accorded officers by the
provisions of Title I pertaining to the rights to speak freely,103 to
1
participate equally in union votes and other. decision-making, 0'
and to sue the union.105 Two Senators remarked on the importance
of protecting union officers against retaliation because of their exercise of free speech rights.10 8 Speaking in support of the McClellan Bill of Rights, Senator Goldwater read a letter from Godfrey
Schmidt, one of the monitors appointed by Judge Letts to force
the Teamsters' leadership to comply with their legal obligations, to
the effect that legal protections were needed by members and officers against reprisals.10 7 Senator Mundt denounced an incident in
which the Operating Engineers suppressed a popular local leader,
which he characterized as "trying to circumvent freedom of speech
on the part of the local . ...018
Moreover, the members of Congress assumed that the requirement of due process in union discipline, contained in section
101(a)(5) of the Act,109 which refers only to discipline of "members," comprehended as well the suspension of officers who abused
their positions. Because concern was expressed that the bill might
prevent suspension of a defalcating officer before more damage
could be done,110 the sponsors, apparently at the suggestion of Senator Prouty, made legislative history that suspension from office
was not covered by that provision.1 From this fact it could be
103. LMRDA

§ 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2).

104. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1).
105. LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4).
106. English v. Cunningham, 269 F.2d 517, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
107. II LEGISLATVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 1115.
108. Id. at 1105.
109. LMRDA § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5).
110. II LEGISLATVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 1572 (Representative Thompson); id.at
1667-68 (Representative McCormack).
111. See, e.g., I LEGISLATivE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 935 (Conference Report). See
also A. McADAMS, supra note 100, at 250. This background implies that a permanent removal from office, rather than a suspension pending a hearing, should be covered by the
procedural protections of § 101(a)(5), in a manner analogous to the differing treatment provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for permanent discharges and
removals pending a hearing on eventual discharge. See, e.g., Temple v. Bushell, 500 F.2d 591
(9th Cir. 1974). However, the courts have uniformly concluded that removal from office is
not "discipline" within the meaning of § 101(a)(5). See, e.g., Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d
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concluded that references to "members" in the remaining subsections of section 101, absent similar limits in the legislative history,
1 12
embrace members who hold official positions with the union.
On the other hand, an explicit reference in one version of section 101(a)(4), protecting the right of any "member or officer" to
sue, was removed in conference without explanation. 113 The Conference Report did not point out this difference. 114 During a debate
on tax legislation, Senator Goldwater took time out to insert a document in the Congressional Record, analyzing the many differences
between the two bills, which pointed out that the Senate bill "extends protection of the right to sue expressly to union officers."11 5
In Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, Judge Kalodner found this
persuasive evidence that "member" does not include officers, 1 " despite the absence of anything in the legislative history to support
that interpretation. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the Landrum-Griffin substitute, widely characterized by its opponents as
"extreme," "punitive," and "vengeful,' 1 7 would have been more
moderate in this regard than the Kuchel substitute passed by the
Senate.
The legislative history is thus inconclusive. In light of the lastminute introduction of the Bill of Rights on the floor, it would
probably be a mistake to infer too much from such sketchy legislative history. Rather, the Act should be construed in light of its
340, 342 (9th Cir. 1964). In Finnegan v. Leu, 50 U.S.L.W. 4480, 4481-82 n.9 (May 17, 1982),
the Supreme Court noted the King holding, and, without expressly approving it, proceeded
on the assumption that it was correct. This conclusion has complicated the analysis of retaliation for exercise of free speech. See note 134 infra.
112. Representative Griffin later stated that protection of officers is required by the
purposes of the Act. Griffin, The Landrum-GriffinAct: Twelve Years of Experience in Protecting Employee Rights, 5 GA. L. REv. 622, 629-30 (1971).
113. Compare § 101(a)(4) as passed by Senate ("member or officer"), I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 98, at 520, with the Landrum-Griffin substitute. Id. at 630 ("members"). The Conference Committee adopted the House version. So far as the author has
been able to discover, there is no written explanation for this decision, which was apparently
made on the first day of the conference as part of efforts to eliminate minor differences first.
A. McADAMS, supra note 100, at 245.
114. I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 935, 949.
115. 105 CONG. REC. 16487 (1959).
116. 306 F.2d 152, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1962). The distinction is also cited in Finnegan v.
Leu, 50 U.S.L.W. 4480, 4481 n.7 (May 17, 1982).
117. See II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 1617 (Representative Green); id. at
1628 (Representative Lane); id. at 1669 (Representative Mason); id. at 1674 (Representative
Philbin).
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broad purposes.""
Indeed, Congress early eschewed the course of enacting detailed provisions for protection of particular rights in particular
contexts at particular levels of the union.""9 Instead, a broad charter for democracy was enacted in general terms-not based on any

desire to deny members' entitlement to the "broadest possible
right," but because a precise bill could not possibly do justice to
the many aspects of rights so basic as freedom of speech. 20 Congress simply intended to apply the Bill of Rights in the United
States Constitution to the activities of the participants in union
121
government.
B.

Statutory Protection of Officers' Rights

In light of Congress' preference for the generic approach, it is
not surprising that the Bill of Rights in Title I does not refer to
specific classes of members, such as elected or appointed officers.
Yet democracy does not require, or even permit, that rank-and-file
members make every decision. 2' 2 Thus, a governing structure
which depends on rank-and-file participation alone-whether by
town meetings in a football stadium or by triennial elections-as
118. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n., 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968).
Given the frequent warnings about inferring too much from isolated fragments of legislative
history, it is somewhat surprising that so many courts have deferred to language in S. REP.
No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), to the effect that judicial intrusion in internal union
affairs should be minimized, id. at 7, when interpreting Title I. After all, that Report accompanied S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), which omitted any Bill of Rights despite the
urgings of forces as diverse as Senator McClellan and the American Civil Liberties Union,
Rothman, supra note 102, at 206; the language in question was a justification for this omission. Instead, the committee proposed to encourage unions to adopt and police internally
compliance with Ethical Practices Codes, I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 418-21.
The adoption on the floor, first of the McClellan amendment, then of the Landrum-Griffin
substitute, amounts to a repudiation of this portion of Senate Report No. 187.
119. For example, H. R. REP. No. 4473, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), introduced by
Representative Barden, then Chairman of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
contained a Bill of Rights thirty pages long. I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 174204.
120. II LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 98, at 1623 (Representative Barden).
121. II LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 98, at 1103, 1104 (Senator McClellan); id. at
1645 (Representative Landrum). See also note 145 infra. Further, even the provisos to §
101(a)(2) were intended to specify that the limitations of the constitutional freedom of
speech apply to the Union Members' Bill of Rights.
122. The literature on union democracy has considered at length the problems unions
have in attracting more than token attendance at meetings. See, e.g., MILLER, ZELLER &
MILLER, supra note 26, at 55-57.
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the means for membership control of the union is likely to be a
charade.113 Congress recognized that fact and sought to foster instead an effective system of representative democracy.""
As has been discussed in Part I of this Article, such a representative system requires protection of the rights of union officers,
so that they may freely espouse the sometimes divergent views of a
heterogeneous membership.' 2 5 Otherwise it becomes all but impossible for a member who disagrees with the incumbent leadership to
win major office, because the sources of realistic candidates for
such offices are the lower union officers' " and a candidate cannot
hope to garner sufficient support to win major office without securing the assistance of other union officials. 2 7 Moreover, without
protection for the speech of officers, it is doubtful that officers
could be effectively criticized, 28 inasmuch as the most articulate
and politically adept (and politically credible) union members tend
to be stewards or other lower level officials. 29
Indeed, access to sufficient information to make credible objections is regularly available only to union officials. 30 The facts of
Salzhandler v. Caputo'3 ' illustrate this point. In the course of examining canceled checks, Salzhandler, the financial secretary of
Painters Local 442, found indications that the local's president had
embezzled funds. When Salzhandler published his findings, using
rather strong language to characterize the president's behavior, the
union stripped Salzhandler of his elected office. Obviously, had he
123.

SEIDMAN & LONDON, supra note 36, at 272.
124. Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 182 n.21 (1964). See also A. COOK, supra
note 47, at 178.
125. Soffer, supra note 34, at 97, 123; Summers, supra note 35, at 3. Edelstein and
Warner, studying the closeness of national union elections over a thirty-five year period, and
using close vote as an indicator of a high level of union democracy, have concluded that the
availability of full-time officials with independent powers is one of the most important
structural prerequisites for union democracy. See EDELSTEIN & WARNER, supra note 60, at
319.
126. See text & accompanying notes 41-47 & 58-66 supra. See generally James, supra
note 60.
127. See text & accompanying note 49 supra.
128. "It cannot be said that [a union officer's] freedom of speech as a member is
unimpaired when that which made his speech effective is removed for improper disciplinary
reasons." Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974).
129. W. LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 302 (1961).
130. See text & accompanying notes 19, 33, 38 & 44 supra.
131. 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).

686

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

not held the office in the first place, Salzhandler would never have
obtained the information and the membership would have been
the poorer for it.
Thus the membership as a whole, as well as individual officers,
have a strong interest in protecting their chosen representatives
from being shunted aside simply because officials higher in the
uhion's governing structure do not approve of their use of Title I
rights. 132 Accordingly, most courts have recognized that the
protec133
tions of Title I extend at least to elected union officers.
The arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.1 3 4 First, it is
132.

In Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 989

(1968), international officers replaced the local's officers with its own personnel, but did not

prevent any members from speaking their own minds. The court recognized that unless the
officers were permitted to take part freely in the local's government, the formal freedom to
speak at a meeting was hollow:
[T]he cornerstone of democratic rule [is] that the government is freely chosen by
the governed. And the representatives . . . may not be shunted aside without
gravely endangering the individual rights of the membership.
Id. at 518. Thus members may sue to vindicate their officers' rights. See also Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1 (1973) (reprisal against one member threatens the rights of all); 29 U.S.C. §
501(b) (permitting one member to sue on behalf of all to vindicate rights). Some courts,
however, have limited standing to sue against such reprisals to the affected officers themselves. See, e.g., Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974).
133. D.C. Circuit: Lamb v. Miller, 660 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1981). First Circuit: Maceira
v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981). Second Circuit: Newman v. Communications Workers
Local 1101, 597 F.2d 833 (1979). Fourth Circuit: Bradford v. Textile Workers, 563 F.2d 1138
(4th Cir. 1977). Fifth Circuit: Miller v. Holden, 535 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1976). But cf.
N.L.R.B. v. Boilermakers, 581 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1978) (dictum suggests that § 101(a)(4)
may protect only the union-member relationship, not union-officer relationship). Sixth Circuit: Witte v. Myers, 343 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Mich. 1971). But see Navarro v. Leu, 469 F.
Supp. 832 (N.D. Ohio 1979), aff'd, No. 79-3415 (6th Cir. March 23, 1981), afl'd, 50 U.S.L.W.
4480 (May 17, 1982) (union-officer relationship not protected; unpublished order seems to
adopt view that elected officers, but not appointed officers, are protected, Supreme Court
does not discuss elected officers). Seventh Circuit: Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). Eighth Circuit: Gabauer v. Woodcock, 520 F.2d
1084 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061 (1976). Ninth Circuit: Machinists v. King,
335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964). Only the Third Circuit has
adopted and sustained a clearly contrary view. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626,
306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962). But cf. Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 628 F.2d 826, 831 (3d Cir. 1980)
(whether officers are protected by § 101(a)(4) is an "important question" which need not be
decided); Koenig v. Clark, 536 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1982) (Sheridan rule limited to removals based on exercise of powers of office).
134. Some courts have been troubled by the issue of whether removal from office is
included within the term "otherwise discipline" in § 609 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 529, which
forbids such action against a member for exercise of any right provided by the LMRDA.
See, e.g., Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974). The courts have had to strain to conclude that "otherwise discipline" has a broad
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argued that the very language of the statute is limited to "members," and that, because the statute does not explicitly extend
rights to "officers," removal from office does not affect a protected
right. 3 5 However, every union requires membership of a given du-

ration preceding nomination for elected office and most unions appoint all staff members, except professional and clerical workers,
from within their own ranks. 136 There is no evidence that Congress
intended to exclude any particular class of members from the
rights provided by Title I.113 To the contrary, Congress defined the

"members" who were to be protected by the statute very broadly,
including all who had "fulfilled the requirements for membership"

and had neither withdrawn nor been expelled.138 The only efforts
to restrict the definition of membership were directed to ensuring
that unions would not be forced to admit blacks, even when they
belonged to other segregated locals in the same international. 3 9
Nor, for that matter, is the issue whether a member has a
"right to be an officer," or whether that status is only a "privilege."
Members have a right not to be discriminated against because of
the exercise of speech rights. 140 The "right-privilege" distinction
has been repudiated in constitutional litigation,14 1 and is no more
valid here. Although the process of eliminating this distinction and
replacing it with such doctrines as the ban on "unconstitutional

conditions" had not been completed by 1959 when the LMRDA
reach because removal is generally considered to be outside the meaning of "discipline"
within the meaning of § 101(a)(5). Section 609 is needed for protection of the exercise of
rights under Titles II, III and IV, part or all of which confer exclusive standing for federal
court enforcement on the Secretary of Labor. Title I, however, has its own enforcement
provision, § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412, which allows a member to sue if "rights secured by the
provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation of this title." Union Free
Speech, supra note 12, at 169. The Supreme Court's decision in Finnegan v. Leu, 50
U.S.L.W. 4480 (May 17, 1982), makes clear that at the very least § 609 does not apply to
removal as an "appointed union employee." Id. at 4481. In any event, filing suit under § 609
does not provide any advantages over suing under § 102; thus the meaning of "otherwise
discipline" is not important to vindication of officers' Title I rights.
135. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1963).
136. See, e.g., ROTHBAUM, supra note 32, at 107, 108.
137. If anything, the evidence is to the contrary. See notes 103 to 123 supra.
138. LMRDA § 3(o), 29 U.S.C. § 402(o).

139. A. McADAMS, supra note 100, at 102-04.
140. Thus, for example, a member has no right to receive death benefits or not to be.
assaulted by goons under federal law; yet the Act clearly would preclude the union from
cutting off financial benefits, or from having its members assaulted because they exercise
their rights under Title I. See, e.g., Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1980).
141. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). See also id. at 571 n.9.
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was enacted,14 2 Congress' apparent intent was not to freeze into
place a particular set of exceptions to the free speech guarantee,
but rather to let them evolve, as in the constitutional setting, by
judicial application of the provisos.14 3
Second, the concern is expressed that an officer may "freeze

himself in office on First Amendment grounds.

' 14 4

Thus, it is said

that forbidding union officers to remove subordinates with whom
they disagree would unduly interfere with the effectiveness and
unity of the union.1 45 Insofar as this argument is directed to the
possibility that subordinates may either refuse, or be unable, to
carry out duties of which they disapprove, 146 it is rebutted by the
fact that any officer may be removed for that reason, although
there is admittedly a "fine line" between such refusals
and free
1 47 a matter discussed at some length infra.1' 4
speech,
However, the courts have proved willing and able to distinguish between cases in which protected activity is a reason for discipline and those in which a person who happened to engage in
protected activity was disciplined for other reasons. 149 As in other
free speech contexts, once the unlawful animus is shown, the defendant need only prove that the official would have been removed
anyway.15 0 Moreover, because no hearing is required before the removal,1 51 the action can be accomplished quickly and lawfully-so
142. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
143. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 6715-45 (1959), II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at
1238 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
144. See, e.g., Newman v. Communications Workers Local 1101, 570 F.2d 439, 445 (2d
Cir. 1978). Union defendants rely on this argument most heavily in these cases.
145. See, e.g., Navarro v. Leu, 469 F. Supp. 832, 835 (N.D. Ohio 1979), af'd, No. 793415 (6th Cir. March 23, 1981), aff'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4480 (May 17, 1982).
146. See, e.g., Sewell v. Machinists, 445 F.2d 545, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1024 (1972).
147. Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849, 855-56 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974).
148. See text & accompanying notes 173-237 infra.
149. See, e.g., Price v. UMW, 376 F. Supp. 1015 (D.D.C. 1974), af'd, 515 F.2d 1018
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (§ 101(a)(2) claims of two union officials deemed spurious, another's claim
upheld).
150. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (First Amendment);
Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1980), enf. denied, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981) (National Labor Relations Act). But cf. Texas Dep't of Cmnty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (burden of persuasion remains at all times on Title VII
plaintiff).
151. See note 111 supra.
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long as the exercise of Title I rights is not the reason.15 2
Third, some courts have suggested that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor to enforce the Act's provisions concerning elections contained in Title IV15 3 might preclude officers
from litigating their access to union office under Title ."5 However, Title IV does not extend generally to access to union office-it regulates only election procedures and a complaint about
removal from office is simply a different subject.155 Even when a
member complains about denial of eligibility to run for union office
because of discipline imposed in violation of Title I, the Secretary
of Labor declines to intervene, but rather refers the member to the
remedies available under Title 1.156 In any event, this argument
would not be applicable to either appointed union officers or the
large number of elected officers, such as stewards and business
157
agents, who are not "officers" within the meaning of Title IV.
152. The extent to which unions might face suits for violating a member's Title I rights,
despite the existence of independent reasons for the removal from office, is simply the price
they must pay for "coming of age" as powerful institutions. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor
Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REv. 819, 853 (1960).
153. Section 403 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 483. The problem arises because, in Calhoon v.
Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964), the Court declared that even if rights under § 101(a)(1) are
implicated in a controversy concerning a recent union election, the plaintiffs must submit
their claims to the Secretary of Labor who then has very broad prosecutorial discretion.
Dunlap v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 580 (1975). See generally, Comment, Titles I & IV of the
LMRDA: A Resolution of the Conflict of Remedies, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 166 (1974). But see
Crowley v. Teamsters Local 82, 110 L.R.R.M. 2445 (1st Cir. 1982) (in some circumstances, §
101(a)(1) claim may be pursued); Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 50 U.S.L.W. 4626, 4630 n.10
(June 14, 1982) (even if rule is consistent with Title IV, it must also satisfy Title I).
154. See, e.g., Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974). In Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973), such considerations led the court
to conclude that Title I remedies are not available unless the removal from office is part of a
conspiracy to intimidate the membership as a whole and suppress dissent. In Newman v.
Communications Workers Local 1101, 597 F.2d 833, 837 (1979), the same court relaxed the
standard to forbid any removal which infringes the officer's right as a member to criticize
official policy, a standard akin to that established in Wood.
155. Buffalow v. Carpenters, 110 L.R.R.M. 2499, (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). See also Crowley
v. Teamsters Local 82, 110 L.R.R.M. 2445, 2462 (1st Cir. 1982) (Bownes, J., dissenting) (line
between Title I and Title IV depends on whether relief sought is a new election).
156. 45 Fed. Reg. 65,926 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 452.136(b)). The Department does have jurisdiction to require installation of a properly elected officer, McDonald v.
Oliver, 525 F.2d 1217, 1224 (5th Cir. 1976). It will, however, not intervene against a removal
from office unless the removal was done in order to void a properly conducted election.
Conversation between author and Beate Bloch, then Associate Solicitor of Labor for LaborManagement Standards Enforcement.
157. Section 3(n) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 402(n), defines "officer" as any constitutional
officer, any person authorized to perform the functions of president, vice president, secre-
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The danger to the union's efficiency, while an important consideration, should not outweigh an even graver danger-loss of
membership control of unions-posed by a rule permitting the removal of officers because of disagreements with the powers that
be. 158 It is worthy of note that, contrary to the disfavor many union
leaders evince toward rank-and-file activism, most dispassionate
observers believe that such involvement makes the union stronger
in its struggles against management. 159 However that may be, in
passing Title I Congress struck the balance in favor of democracy
and against "the efficiency of a monolithic union."' 60 As the court
of appeals stated in Salzhandler v. Caputo:""'
The union argues that there is a public interest in promoting the monolithic character of unions in their dealings with employers. But Congress
weighed this factor and decided that the desirability of protecting the democratic process within the unions outweighs any possible weakening of unions
in their dealings with employers which may result from the freer expression
of opinions within the unions.

Additional protection for the rights of union officers may be
provided by the National Labor Relations Act. In a number of
cases, the Board has ruled that discipline imposed on union officers
and entities because they filed or supported unfair labor practice
charges constitutes unlawful restraint or coercion and so violates
section 8(b)(1)(A). 6 2 The early cases involved fines or expulsion
from the union. 6 3 In later cases, however, the doctrine has been
extended to union sanctions that relate solely to the governing process of the union, such as imposition of a trusteeship, removal from
union office, or denial of eligibility to run for office.1 64 Although
tary, treasurer, or other executive functions of a labor organization, and any member of its
executive board or similar governing body.
158. See text & accompanying notes 14-18 & 122-33 supra.
159. See, e.g., MILLER, ZELLER & MILLER, supra note 26, at 70-71; A. RosE, UNION SOLIDARITY: THE INTERNAL COHESION OF A LABOR UNION 183-84 (1952); Compa, supra note 74, at
14-16.
160. Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 989
(1968).
161. 316 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
162. See, e.g., UAW Local 212, 257 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 108 L.R.R.M. 1003 (1981); Operating Engineers Local 138, 148 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 57 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1964).
163. Marine Workers Local 22, 159 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 62 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1966), enf. denied, 379 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
164. Clothing Workers Local 424, 193 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 78 L.R.R.M. 1348 (1971); ILA
Local 1367, 148 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 57 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1964). The distinction between a fine or
expulsion and removal from office has been rejected, first, because discipline of an officer
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section 8(b)(1)(A) permits unions a considerable degree of freedom
from regulation of strictly internal affairs, 8 5 these cases have been
based on the propositions that unimpeded access to the Board is
a higher public interest, 66 and that interference with access to
the Board is "beyond the legitimate interests of a labor
organization.' 7
Whether this protection will be extended beyond filing of
NLRB charges remains unclear. Insofar as the reasoning for the
prohibition rests on the special character of the right of access to
the NLRB, the doctrine is subject to natural and fairly confining
limits. The Board will frequently apply stricter standards to discipline imposed for filing unfair labor practice charges than to violations of other rights.168 Only one decision has gone further-in a

case where the union officer was removed for filing a charge against
the union with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
the Board found a violation, reasoning that the policies favoring
uninhibited access to the Board applied equally to access to other
government agencies. 69 On the other hand, the doctrine may be
quite expansive insofar as the exception to the "internal union affairs" exception to section 8(b)(1)(A) relied on the rather elastic
concept of "legitimate interests" of the union. 70 For example, the
implicitly threatens rank-and-file members, and so discourages their access to the Board.
See Meat Cutters Local 590, 181 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 73 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1970). Second, union
office often carries with it benefits, the threatened loss of which may have a "powerful innibiting effect." General Am. Transp., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 228, 95 L.R.R.M. 1580, 1581 (1977),
enf. denied, N.L.R.B. v. Boilermakers, 581 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1978).
165. N.L.R.B. v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
166. Teamsters Local 528, 237 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 99 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1978).
167. N.L.R.B. v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968).
168. For example, according to Filmation Associates, 227 N.L.R.B. No. 237, 94
L.R.R.M. 1470 (1977), the Board will not defer to an arbitral resolution of § 8(a)(4) issues.
169. Teamsters Local 528, 237 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 99 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1978). The right to
seek protection from government agencies by concerted action is protected under § 8(a)(1)
of the N.L.R.A. See note 6 supra.
170. One court of appeals decision rejected the Board's rule on the ground that the
union had a legitimate interest in discouraging the particular unfair labor practice charge
that had been filed, not on the basis that access to the union office is strictly a union affair.
See N.L.R.B. v. Boilermakers, 581 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1978). Union steward Soape had ignored the grievance procedure in filing a charge against his employer. The union, fearing
that the charge would discourage adherence to the grievance procedure, and undermine its
credibility with the employer, urged Soape to withdraw it, and removed him from office
when he failed to do so. The court upheld this discipline as consistent with the national
labor policy favoring the resolution of disputes through the contractual grievance proce-
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union has no legitimate interest in preventing internal dissent over
collective bargaining policies or in stopping insurgent candidacies
for union office.17 1 The NLRA's protection of officers could 11thus
2
become as extensive as that under the Landrum-Griffin Act.
C.

The Limits of the Protection of Officers
To say that union officers are protected by Title I, however, is

not to say that there are no limits to that protection. The free
speech subsection of Title I has a proviso that specifically sets
forth three such limits-the union may enforce reasonable rules 1)
governing conduct at meetings; 2) concerning the responsibility of

members toward the organization as an institution; and 3) preventing conduct that would interfere with the union's performance of
its legal or contractual obligations. 17 3 The proviso's protection of a
union's legitimate interests makes exclusion of a whole class of
members from the Act's protections unnecessary; concomitantly, it
defines the limits of the legitimacy of union interests involved.
Thus, before discussing the ways in which this proviso applies to

union officers, it would be well to review briefly the general principles governing its application.
First, the union may limit the right of free speech only if it is
seeking to "enforce [a] reasonable rule" that advances one of the
dures. The court recognized that, had the charge been against the union, a different result
might have followed. Curiously, Judge Vance, the dissenting judge, would have forbidden
discipline for filing against the employer while permitting it for a charge against the union.
Id. at 481.
171. A union violates § 8(b)(2) by encouraging the employer to discriminate for such
reasons. Fruin-Colnon Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 571 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1978); Rust Engineering
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 445 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1971).
172. The NLRA's protection may be even greater under § 8(a) of the Act, inasmuch as
the union acts as an employer of its officers who are considered employees, whether elected
or appointed. Retail Clerks v. N.L.R.B., 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966). For example, officers'
removal because of a concerted refusal to work based on a dispute over working conditions
might well be protected under the NLRA, N.L.R.B. v. Washington Alum. Co., 370 U.S. 9
(1962), even though it would be unprotected as patent insubordination under Title I, See
text & accompanying note 224 infra.
173. Section 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). The absence of such a restriction on the
right to sue in § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4), suggests that such defenses may be unavailable to unions which discipline officers for exercising this right. In judging a union's
claim that its purposes are within one of the objectives stated in the provisos, the courts
should look to the legislative history to see whether the purpose was one which Congress
intended to protect. Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 50 U.S.L.W. 4626, 4630 (June 14, 1982).
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three objectives set forth in the proviso. 174 Although there is some
authority that, at least as applied to union officers, the rule need
not be in writing, 17 5 there must at least be a regular practice to
which the union can point and which shows that the conduct in

question was forbidden for all persons, not just the particular officer."7 6 Even if it would be appropriate to punish certain conduct
under a reasonable rule, the union's action is invalid if the rule
may be
that was used is not itself reasonable,7 7 just as punishment
78
enjoined if rules are unconstitutionally overbroad.I
Second, mere theoretical possibilities of divisiveness or disunity, even during a strike, have never been sufficient to warrant

discipline under the proviso. 179 Rather, the union must prove that
there is a serious and immediate threat to the union or to its ability to fulfill its obligations. s0 Indeed, in their comprehensive study
of the enforcement of the Landrum-Griffin Act, McLaughlin and
Schoomaker concluded that the courts almost never find a threat
sufficiently grave so as to warrant application of the proviso.' 8 '
This is, in effect, a variation of the imminent and likely harm
test" 2 that is required under the First Amendment 83 before a
174. Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981).
175. Id. There is some question whether this analysis is correct, inasmuch as the establishment of formal standards to eliminate any official discretion in the application of penalties and the requirement of clear notice of impermissible conduct have always been deemed
far more important when the regulation of expression is at stake than in other matters. See,
e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). Although § 101(a)(5) permits discipline in the absence of a written rule, Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971), efforts to extend the Boilermakers holding to § 101(a)(2) complaints have been rejected. See, e.g., Bise v. IBEW Local 1969, 618 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir.
1979).
176. Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981).
177. See, e.g., Sadlowski v. Steelworkers, 645 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 50 U.S.L.W. 4626 (June 14, 1982); Sherman, The Individual Member and the
Union: The Bill of Rights Title in the Labor-ManagementReporting and DisclosureAct of
1959 (L.M.R.D.A.), 54 Nw. U. L. REV. 803, 811 (1960).
178. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
179. See, e.g., Kuebler v. Cleveland Litho. and Photo. Local 24-P, 473 F.2d 359 (6th
Cir. 1973).
180. Stachan v. Weber, 535 F.2d 1202, 1203 (9th Cir. 1976); Degan v. Tugmen's and
Pilots' Ass'n., 84 L.R.R.M. 2569 (N.D. Ohio 1973).

181. D. McLAUGHLIN & A. SCHOOMAKER,

THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN

ACT

AND UNION DEMoc-

93 (1979). The decision in Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 50 U.S.L.W. 4626 (June 14,
1982), which upheld a union rule under the proviso, may lead to increasid judicial reliance
upon it.
182. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
183. According to Senator McClellan, the provisos were intended to make explicit that
RACY
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public authority may proscribe speech.1 84 Of course, the possession
of the platform provided by union office may increase the likelihood that a particular harm will be caused and the court should
consider this potential if established by the union.
1. Protection of appointed officers. Although the issue of the
protection of elected union officers has been nearly unanimously
resolved in favor of coverage by Title 1, 85 the extension of those
protections to appointed officers has met with far less approval.1 86
Some courts have concluded that appointed officers deserve no
protection against removal from office; 1' 7 others have determined
that they deserve as much protection as elected officers.188 In Finnegan v. Leu, s9 the Supreme Court ruled that the union's top administrators, whose allegiance to elected officers was necessary to
implementation of the latter's program, are not protected under
the limitations implicit in the federal Bill of Rights applied to § 101(a)(2) as well. II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 1294. The courts have normally turned to the First
Amendment for analogous principles when applying the general language of § 101(a)(2),
although cautioning that these principles must be applied in light of the special circumstances of unions and the statutory language permitting reasonable rules. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 50 U.S.L.W. 4626, 4629 (June 14, 1982).
184. Indeed, in Degan v. Tugmen's and Pilots' Ass'n, 84 L.R.R.M. 2569 (N.D. Ohio
1973), the court relied on three earlier First Amendment cases which used the clear and
present danger test when deciding that Degan, a local union president who had brought his
local to the brink of disaster by, inter alia, leading a wildcat strike, using union funds to
advocate disaffiliation, could properly be punished by expulsion. See also Sawyers v. Machinists, 279 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (officers so disrupted union that it had to secure
injunction against their activities).
185. See text & accompanying note 133 supra.
186. Levy, Litigation Update, 2 Labor Update No. 1, at 13 (1981).
187. Wambles v. Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974); Cehaich v. UAW, 496 F.
Supp. 912 (E.D. Mich. 1980), appeal pending, No. 81-1134; Navarro v. Leu, 469 F. Supp.
832 (N.D. Ohio 1979), af'd, 79-3415 (6th Cir. March 23, 1981), af'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4480 (May
17, 1982). See also Comment, Reprisal Discharges of Union Officials, 10 U. MICH. J. LAW
REFORM 274, 290-91 (1977).
188. Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir.
1976); Price v. U.M.W., 376 F. Supp. 1015 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); George v. Bricklayers, 255 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Wis. 1966); Weyhmueller v. Jani.
tors Union Local 1, 509 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Ill. 1981). See also Witte v. Myers, 343 F. Supp.
873, 884 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (dictum, but case involved elected officer). In DiCampli v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746 (D.N.J. 1968), the court ruled that appointees are protected, reasoning
that conflicting authority in Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962),
was contrary to the modem trend. More recent decisions such as Harrison v. A.F.S.C.M.E.
Local 54, 518 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1042 (1975), however, suggest
that DiCampli may not be good law. But cf. Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 628 F.2d 826, 831 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981) (suggesting this may be an open question).
189. 50 U.S.L.W. 4480 (May 17, 1982).
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Title 1.190 The question of whether lesser appointees have any protection was expressly reserved.1 91
Most of the factors considered above, with respect-to the protection of elected officers, 192 apply equally to those who are appointed to their positions. However, there is one substantial difference-Title IV of the Act requires that elected officers have a
limited term of office. 193 Appointees, on the other hand, are not
normally selected for a specific term; rather, they serve at the pleasure of the appointing officer or body. This means that there may
procedure for union members to review their
not be a regular
19 4
performance.
An officer who is elected for a term of years may be removed
by the voters without any question that the removal violated Title
I rights.19 5 During the election process the voters may of course
190. Id. The question on which certiorariwas granted referred solely to "freedom of
speech political rights. . . ." Finnegan v. Leu, 50 U.S.L.W. 3215 (1981); the Court's opinion
refers sometimes to Title I generally, and sometimes to § 101(a)(2) in particular.. It is thus
arguable that the Court's holding may not apply to removal of officers based on their exercise of § 101(a)(4) rights.
191. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4482 n.11, 4483. Indeed, the question on which certiorari was
granted was limited to whether "business agents" were protected against summary removal.
Finnegan v. Leu, 50 U.S.L.W. 3215 (1981). The Court's opinion refers variously to union
"staff," "agents," "employees" and "administrators." Decisive significance should not be attributed to the use of one particular term at any part of the opinion; rather, each should be
understood to be limited by the express reservation of the issue of protection of appointees
whose disagreement would not prevent elected officers from carrying out their programs.
The Court also left open the possibility that a removal from office, which is otherwise permissible, might violate the Act because it is "part of a purposeful and deliberate attempt to
suppress dissent within the union. . . ." 50 U.S.L.W. at 4482.
192. See text & accompanying notes 89-160 supra.
193. Local officers must be elected by the membership every three years; national officers every five years; and officers of intermediate bodies every four years. LMRDA § 401,
29 U.S.C. § 481 (1976). The officers who must be elected rather than appointed are defined
by their functions. LMRDA § 3(n), 29 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1976). By contrast, officers of many
British unions are elected by convention or by a large executive council for an indefinite
term. Although such officers can normally be removed by the same bodies, such removals
are even more rare than by American union elections. EDFLSTEIN & WARNER, supra note 60,
at 185.
194. Although a union's bylaws provide that a position be filled by appointment, it is
not uncommon for such offices-particularly stewards and grievance handlers-to be filled
by an informal election. See, e.g., Witte v. Myers, 343 F. Supp. 873, 883 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
195. Indeed, § 401(h) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 481(h) (1976), specifically requires unions
to maintain procedures for removal for serious misconduct, and permits the Secretary of
Labor to require a secret ballot recall election. Vitrano v. Marshall, 504 F. Supp. 1381
(D.D.C. 1981). It has been held that the protections of Title I should not be applied to
removal by vote of the membership. Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.
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take candidates' positions on political issues, as well as their honesty or competence, into account. Such actions are wholly consistent with democratic unionism. Thus, if an officer were removed by
a recall election, there would be no violation of the Act. Yet an
appointed official, who need never run for reelection, may be in a
position to cling to a job and perform in a way which could impede
the membership from exercising its will via election of officers. 196
A court which is faced with an appointee's Title I claim must
be sensitive to this danger. 197 However, it does not justify total abrogation of the protections of Title I, because it is outweighed by
the reasons, discussed earlier, why the availability of such protections is crucial to democratic unionism. 198 After all, an appointed
official is paid by, and ought to owe allegiance to, not the elected
officer but the union-that is, the official works for the membership. Although officers may confuse their own interests with those
of the union, it is the latter that must control.199 However, when
1962). Care must be taken, however, to assure that the vote is truly fair. See text & accompanying notes 235-37 infra.
196. See, e.g., Finnegan v. Leu, 50 U.S.L.W. 4480, 4482 (May 17, 1982); Wambles v.
Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888, 889-90 (5th Cir. 1974). In Cehaich v. U.A.W., 496 F. Supp. 912, 915
(E.D. Mich. 1980), the court advances the argument that an appointed officer "may be presumed to contravene the will of the membership when he contravenes the policies of its
elected officers." The presumption is questionable, inasmuch as the specific disagreement
may have had nothing to do with the issues in the election. In any event, such a presumption would be equally applicable when an elected officer removes a subordinate elected officer. As in that situation, the presumption would be irrelevant even if valid, because the
issue is not whether an appointee can refuse to carry out his duties, but rather whether
disagreement-even with the views of the majority-can be expressed without fear of
retaliation.
197. It could also be argued that a union constitution which makes certain offices appointive and others elective represents a democractic judgment that certain officers should
be subject to removal based on their exercise of free speech rights. See, e.g., Brief for Defendants-Appellees, Cehaich v. UAW, No. 81-1134 (6th Cir.) at 41-42. See also Finnegan v.
Leu, 50 U.S.L.W. 4480, 4482 (May 17, 1982) (Supreme Court mentions bylaws, but does not
give them controlling significance). This argument proves too much, however, because many
union constitutions also expressly or implicitly permit removal of elected officers; indeed, if
the removal were contrary to the constitution it would never be necessary to reach the Title
I issue. Moreover, even if the constitution was adopted by a democratic vote, it is questionable whether, in most cases, provisions for removal of officers represent a considered judgment by the rank-and-file. Finally, protection of officers' Title I rights does not rest on the
premise that there has been a democratic rank-and-file judgment that such protections are
required. Rather, the basis is that such protections are required in order to permit rankand-file control by majoritarian processes to be effective.
198. See text & accompanying notes 89-160 supra.
199. Officers are required to exercise their powers solely in the interest of the membership, and may not act as an adverse party. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1976).
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considering the removal of an appointed officer, a court needs to be
particularly sensitive to the precise role of the officer, and the ways
in which the officer's conduct may frustrate the democratic
process.
Title I protection for appointed officers gains further support
by analogy to the First Amendment. A public employee who disagrees with an elected official's policy may also be in a good position to block the effectuation of programs which enjoy a popular
mandate; but mere expression of disagreement or criticism is not
sufficient to warrant dismissal. 0 0 Arguments that elected officials
need to be able to fire supporters of their electoral opponents in
order to be able to function effectively have been rejected. 20 1 The
same reasoning applies with even greater force to Title I given the
greater difficulties posed for opposition factions within unions than
for those in public government.
In balancing the danger that depriving appointees of Title I
rights may impede rank-and-file control against the possibility that
immunity against political removal may frustrate rank-and-file
control through elected officers, the distinction between full-time
union employees and part-time appointees will often be significant.20 2 There will be greater danger of frustration of electoral
mandates, for example, in unions where the elected officers continue to work full-time for their employers, and are only able to
devote time to union business after hours, but hire a union member to work full-time on union business. In these circumstances, it
becomes very difficult for the elected officers to oversee the appointed official's' performance of his functions and it may be reasonable for the former, to insist that their business manager be in
accord with them concerning the major issues facing the union.
Moreover, because the full-time employee will be in a much better
position to appeal on a continuous basis for political support than
his elected nominal superiors, there is a very real danger that the
one official who is not subject to defeat at the polls will become the
dominant political force in the union. Finally, in these circumstances, elections will often, for all practical purposes, be a referen200. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
201. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
202. "At issue here is whether they are . . . immunized from discharge . . . as appointed union employees." Finnegan v. Leu, 50 U.S.L.W. 4480, 4481 (May 17, 1982) (emphasis in original).
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dum on the conduct of the full-time business manager.
At the other end of the spectrum, appointees who continue to
work in the shop and perform their union tasks part-time either
after hours or pursuant to an arrangement which permits them to
leave their posts to handle grievances or other union duties, are
unlikely to be so free of supervision by elected officers or so responsible for making policy that it would be appropriate to deprive
them of Title I protections. Indeed, at this level of union office the
distinction between elective and appointive office breaks down. It
is not uncommon for union stewards and similar officers to be effectively chosen by a formal or informal election among workers in
the unit; this choice is then ratified when the full-time leadership
certifies to the employer that the chosen worker is to be recognized
as the union's agent for its day-to-day dealings with the unit.2 0 3
Whether such officers are considered to have been appointed or
elected does not have much bearing on the extent to which their
opposition to the policies espoused by the centrally elected officials
of the union will impede the implementation of the will of the
union electorate.20 '
Title I's coverage of union members who are appointed to
union positions is closely linked to the additional question,
whether a neutral union rule barring appointees from contributing
to or participating in political campaigns within the union would
be lawful. Such rules, when applied to public employees by federal
or state Hatch Acts, 20° have been held not to be violations of the
First Amendment.0 8 Under the provisions of Title IV of the
LMRDA, which forbids the use of union funds to promote a
203. See, e.g., Newman v. Communications Workers Local 1101, 99 L.R.R.M. 2755,
2759 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1979).

204. Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Finnegan v. Leu describes the reserved question as the protection of "nonpolicymaking and nonconfidential employees." 50
U.S.L.W. 4480, 4482 n.11 (May 17, 1982). The concurrence, by contrast, refers to appointees
"who will be instrumental in evolving the president's administrative policies." Id. at 4483.
This difference in language parallels the differences expounded in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507 (1980), concerning the reach of the First Amendment. The distinction between terms
used in footnote 11 and in the concurrence should not preclude ultimate application of a
Branti-like standard in Title I cases filed by union appointees, when the courts are required
to consider the issue specifically.
205. 5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq. (1976).
206. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (state statute); Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (federal statute).
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candidacy for union office,207 union officers are not permitted to
campaign on union time.2 08 However, they have been permitted
by Labor Department interpretive regulations to engage in
"campaigning incidental to regular union business" absent union
rules to the contrary.2 0 The ability of union staff members to contact most of the membership as part of their employment, while
"incidentally" extolling the incumbents' virtues, to make voluntary
campaign contributions or to take leaves for purposes of full-time
campaigning if necessary, makes a mockery of this nominal
restriction.21 0
Permitting a neutral rule which denies access to staff resources
to both incumbents and insurgents might therefore seem attractive. Moreover, the neutrality of the rule would make it easier to
justify as being based on the institutional interests of the union,
not just the personal interests of the incumbents.
But an internal union Hatch Act, even if neutral on its face, is
unlikely to be truly neutral in effect.2 11 First, the official duties of
most union staff members have highly political aspects-the development of tunion policies, the effectuation of collective bargaining
positions, and so forth. Obviously, the incumbents cannot be denied access to staff assistance for projects that inevitably have
campaign significance as well as official purposes; yet if union employees lent similar assistance to non-incumbents, it would appear
to be "campaigning" and so, perhaps, a violation of the "neutral"
rules.212 Second, and partly as a result of the foregoing, the fine207. LMRDA § 401(g), 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (1976).
208. 29 C.F.R. § 452.76 (1981).
209. Id. Because the Labor Department has exclusive authority to initiate proceedings
to overturn elections under LMRDA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1976), its interpretations are
virtually conclusive. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
210. See James, supra note 60, at 276-78, 287-88; Note, Union Elections and the
L.M.R.D.A.: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE L.J. 407, 465-66 (1972).
211. Professor Stone argues that the more narrow the range of issues covered by a subject-matter restriction of speech, the more likely it is that different viewpoints will be affected to different degrees; accordingly, a speech protective approach is desirable. Stone,
Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 81, 109-14 (1978). He places the Hatch Act cases under the
First Amendment in the category of broadly based restrictions which are thus entitled to
more deference as if it were a content-neutral regulation. Id. at 112. However that may be
for public employees, for the reasons discussed here a union Hatch Act will not likely be
content-neutral, and thus is not entitled to deference.
212. Cf. A. France, Le lys rouge (1894) ("The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the
rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets and to steal bread.").
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ness of the lines distinguishing permissible from impermissible
staff conduct would make it difficult for either union appellate
bodies or public tribunals to enforce union Hatch Acts equitably,
even if the union sought to do so. Indeed, the Labor Department's
self-perceived inability to enforce a fair staff resources rule is apparently the reason it has washed its hands of the problem.21 Finally, internal enforcement of union rules concerning staff conduct
during elections is unlikely to be even subjectively evenhanded, inasmuch as most unions place their disciplinary process in the
hands of the incumbent officers, and do not insulate it from the
political process.2 14
Accordingly, union Hatch Acts, even if well-intentioned, may
too often serve only to give union staff the appearance of neutrality, while making it more difficult for staff members who are disciplined for opposing the incumbents to show that they have been
punished for the content of their political expression, not just for
taking any position at all on union election.2

5

For this reason,

courts should, at least, look with the utmost skepticism when such
rules are offered as a defense to a staff member's Title I suit.21
2. The "fine line between insubordination and free speech."
In many cases, the dispute about the real basis for removal of any
officer will present a clear choice between a lawful reason-such as
incompetence or financial misconduct-and an unlawful rea213.

James, supra note 60, at 278.

214. See generally 2 UNION DEMocRAcY REv. (1973). Indeed, two of the international
unions which had independent review boards, the American Federation of Teachers and the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, have formally eliminated
them. 6 UNION DEMOCRACY REv. 8-10 (1974); 19 UNION DEMOCRACY REV. 1 (1980). See'also
23 UNI o DEMOcRACY RaV. 2 (questioning neutrality of Steelworkers "Neutral Panel" established to enforce election rules).
215. A similar infirmity may be found in union rules which forbid union employees to
run for union office. But cf. Morial v. Judiciary Comm. of Louisiana, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.
1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978) (rule forbidding sitting judge to run for
public office consistent with First Amendment). Accord, Clements v. Fashing, 50 U.S.L.W.
4869 (June 25, 1982). Although a staff member who runs against the incumbents will face
loss of his job, a staff member who supports the incumbents can be appointed to fill a
vacancy; when he runs for "reelection," he is no longer an employee and is not covered by
the rule. See, e.g., 1 UNION DEMOCRACY Rav. 6 (1972). It is not uncommon for all elected
officers in a union to be first appointed to a vacancy, so that they can run with the advantages of incumbency.
216. A union would be able to establish sufficient danger to its institutional interests
under the proviso if it could show that the staff members' conduct was so egregious as to
violate Title IV and warrant overturning the election.
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son-protected expression. In such cases, the court must decide
whether the unlawful or the lawful reason was a cause of the removal.2 1 In other cases, however, the profferred lawful reason may
include conduct that, at least on the part of an ordinary member,
would arguably be protected by Title I. In such cases, the court
must decide on which side of the "fine line... between I . . insubordination ...

and freedom of speech.

.

." the facts fall.2 "

Three factors suggested by Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer in
Maceira v. Pagan21 9 provide a useful starting point for analysis.
The first is the nature of the activity for which the official was
disciplined-"pure speech" versus "a course of conduct inconsistent with his official duties." The second is the role of the officer in
the union and the extent to which absolute loyalty is required or
the expression will interfere with official duties. Finally, Judge
Breyer would consider the extent to which there are "reasonable
rules" which proscribe the conduct at issue.22
The nature of the activity-Judge Breyer's first factor-is of
course an important matter to consider. The proviso to section
101(a)(2) speaks of "conduct" which interferes with the union's obligations, and this may be construed as analogous to the distinction
between regulation of speech and the regulation of conduct under
the First Amendment.2 2 However, whatever the uses of the
222
"speech-conduct" distinction in the First Amendment area,

it

quickly breaks down in the union officer context because of the
very nature of union positions. A union's work is accomplished
only through the "expression" of its agents-organizing, exhorting
217. Lamb v. Miller, 660 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Price v. U.M.W., 376 F. Supp. 1015
(D.D.C. 1974), afld mem., 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
218. Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849, 855-56 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974). The same problems may exist in distinguishing between insubordination and the
right to sue protected by LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1976).
219. 649 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981).

220. Id. at 15.
221.

The "responsibility to the institution" portion of the proviso, on the other hand,

does not even implicitly reflect the distinction.
222.

Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The problem is that very frequently

conduct of one kind or another is in itself a form of expression; indeed, no expression is
possible without some sort of "conduct," be it speaking, carrying a sign, or distributing liter-

ature. The distinction is better put as between content-based restrictions and regulation of
the "time, place and manner" of expression. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. Rav. 1, 22-25. See generally Nimmer, The Meaning of
Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 29 (1973).
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members to take one position or another, bargaining with employers, and so forth. Thus most of the arguably objectionable things a
union official can do will be objectionable because of the content of
the expression involved.2 2
A better distinction would be based upon the target of the activity. The union has a legitimate interest in assuring that concerted action is taken-particularly vis-a-vis the employer-only
pursuant to its internal decision-making procedure. However, the
union as an institution does not have a legally enforceable interest
in having any particular stance taken, so long as the procedures for
deciding the stance have been fair and democratic. Accordingly,
the first key question concerning justifications for a removal ought
to be whether the officer's activity was directed toward influencing
the union's decision about its stance vis-a-vis an employer or other
outside institution, or whether it actually applied the pressure of
the union's or the employees' concerted action to the employer.
Thus, for example, union leaders would be entitled to take action
against a union officer who encourages his constituents to strike at
the expiration of a contract before a national vote on its terms has
been conducted. Particularly where a strike is in violation of a collective bargaining agreement, the proviso to section 101(a)(2)
would permit a union to discipline the officer for both participation
and leadership.2 24 Indeed, the proviso concerning the union's legal
and contractual obligations was included primarily to authorize
unions to discipline wildcat strikers.225 On the other hand, no action could be taken simply because the officer urges his constituents or other officers to oppose a contract negotiated by the top
union leadership.
The nature of the official's duties are also important, but perhaps not in the way that Judge Breyer suggests. Without expressly
adopting a "policy-making or confidential employee" exception,
similar to that proposed by Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in
Elrod v. Burns, 22' Judge Breyer's emphasis on the fact that
223.

See, e.g., Witte v. Myers, 343 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Mich. 1971).

224. The proviso was applied in one case to an unauthorized strike which did not violate the contract. Falcone v. Dantinne, 288 F. Supp. 719, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 420 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1969).
225. Sherman, The Individual Member and the Union: The Bill of Rights Title in the
Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 803, 817-18

(1960).
226. 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976).
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Maceira was "not a policy-making officer," and was so close to being an ordinary member that free expression is appropriate, seems
to imply that ordinary union officers and agents may come within
an analogous exception.22 7
Such a rule would be inappropriate. Union bureaucracies are
small compared to those of public governments and the effect of a
rule permitting an exception for confidential or policy-making positions-those whose occupants must work closely with a supervisor 228 or whose occupants either are intimately involved in policy
formation, or perform largely discretionary rather than ministerial
functions 2 2 -- would be to sweep most union officials, except in the
very largest of union entities, beyond the protection of the Act.
Moreover, most of the few successful insurgencies at the national
level have been spearheaded by upper-level union officers who
were in policymaking or confidential positions.3 0 Indeed, it is the
danger to union democracy that patronage machines create in a
one-party system that is one of the most telling reasons for protecting union officers' Title I rights.
Even under the First Amendment the courts no longer recognize a broad exception for confidential or policy-making positions.2 31 Instead, the question is whether the particular views and
affiliations are an effective measure of performance in the office in
question. Similarly, the nature of the union office ought to be considered only as a point of comparison with the activity-is the activity inconsistent with the duties? Is the official using powers that
were conferred for one union purpose in a way that is opposed to
that purpose? And, of course, bearing in mind that these are affirmative defenses under the provisos, has the union shown that
the officer's action presented a severe threat of damage to the
union's interests?
227. 649 F.2d at 17.
228. See, e.g., Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
937 (1977).
229. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
968 (1977).
230. See text & accompanying note 126 supra.
231. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). As noted above, supra note 204, reference to
"policymaking" and "confidential" employees in Finnegan v. Leu, 50 U.S.L.W. 4480 (May
17, 1982), need not be taken as precluding application of a Branti standard to union appointees. Moreover, Finnegan is limited to the application of Title I to appointed officers, as
opposed to elected officers. Id. at 4480-82. See also Finnegan v. Leu, 50 U.S.L.W. 3215
(1981) (question on certiorarilimited to appointees).
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For example, if a collective bargaining agreement authorized
grievances to be processed only if signed by a steward, the union
leadership has a right to expect that the steward will conform to
union policies in deciding which grievances to sign. It would not be
entitled, however, to insist that a steward refrain from sending letters to government agencies which will hear complaints from anyone, whether a union officer or not, unless the steward purports to
act on the union's
behalf by virtue of use of a title or the union's
23 2
resources.

The existence of "reasonable rules" should also bear on the
lawfulness of an officer's removal. A member should be able to expect more rigorous protection against reprisals based upon ad hoc
rules; an officer's duties are sufficiently varied and most unions
have insufficiently developed bureaucracies to expect that all performance standards be in writing. However, there should be sufficient regularity in a practice or policy upon which an officer's removal may be founded to assure that the decision was not a
discriminatory political reprisal against the officer or his constituents.233 And, of course, the rule or practice must be "reasonable"

and not inconsistent with Title 1.234 Thus, for example, a vague or
general rule, such as "conduct inconsistent with union office,"
would not suffice to justify discipline for the exercise of Title I
rights.
Finally, attention should be paid to the identities of the persons who make a decision to remove an officer. For example, the
fact that officers enjoy Title I rights should not prevent recall elections.23 5 Similarly, when a member or officer is selected as a delegate from the union to a labor council or convention, the body that
makes the selection based on the individual's ability to represent
the union ought to be able to take policy views into account in
232. This point is related to a distinction suggested by Newman v. Local 1101, C.W.A.,
597 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1979). That court suggested that the exercise of one's rights in one's
capacity as a member ought to be protected, but that in the capacity as an officer, one might
be required to express views contrary to one's own. Newman's exception, however, is too
broad. By attaining office one acquires a greater visibility, and ability to influence the
union's decisions, that ought not have to be foregone unless the particular use of the platform, as it were, is inconsistent with the union's purpose in creating the position. See DiCampli v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746, 752 (D.N.J. 1968).
233. Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981).
234. See text & accompanying notes 173-84 supra.
235. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962), Russo v.
Plumbers Local 676, 86 L.R.R.M. 2238, 2240 (D. Conn. 1977).
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deciding whether to select, retain or replace such a representative.
Care must be taken in applying this factor, however, to make
certain that there are adequate safeguards to ensure that it is really the members' sentiments that are being expressed. Membership meetings are often attended mostly by supporters of the incumbent officers and votes conducted are frequently only a routine
rubber stamp of executive board recommendations." s Although it
may not be necessary to employ all the safeguards required by Title IV of the LMRDA, there should at least be adequate notice to
permit all sides to muster their forces for the vote, as well as a fair
and equal opportunity for all union members to express their views
37
2
and participate in the decision.

In sum, an officer who seeks to promote a viewpoint within the
union either on questions of broad policy or on questions of particular applications, ought not to be subject to removal or any other
adverse action for that reason. Only to the extent that the officer
goes beyond that point to interference in the functioning of the
union vis-a-vis the employer should the officer be subjected to
sanctions, just as any other member would be.
III.

PROTECTION AGAINST DISPARATE DISCIPLINE BY THE
EMPLOYER

In Part IEwe saw how union leaders suppress internal controversy by controlling their subordinates in the union's governing
structure. Employers also attempt to safeguard themselves from
the effects of internal union conflicts. They do so mainly by invoking their economic authority to suspend or discharge part-time
union officers whom they employ. Union officers may incur obligations to the employer concerning their conduct as officers which
render them liable to employer discipline. Part III of this article
discusses the circumstances under which such obligations may
arise and the propriety of resulting employer sanctions.
236. See, e.g., Janow v. Schweitzer Div., Kimberly-Clark, 503 F. Supp. 973 (D.N.J.
1980).
237. See note 38 supra.See also ROTHBAUM, supra note 32, at 164 (rank and file executive board, which is truly independent of full-time officers, has power to remove international officers).
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ConstraintsLimiting Sanctions Against Wildcat Strikers

Internal union controversy over the limitations on the role of
union officers' expression and conduct often affects the employer
as well as the union leadership. The effect may be indirect, as
when the controversy arises over the collective bargaining posture
that the union should adopt. It may become more direct as one or
another faction in the union uses "concerted action" against the
employer without having obtained a decision by the union to employ such means.23 The employer's interest in preventing such actions will be particularly strong where it has bargained with the
union for a clause forbidding, for the duration of the collective bargaining agreement, the type of concerted action that has been employed.2 " In such a situation the employer may conclude that it
has paid for the clause with various concessions and seek protection for the benefits of its bargain.
As we have seen, the union may, under the proviso to section
101(a)(2), use its authority to discipline those of its members who
have used concerted action without its approval, particularly where
the activity is forbidden by law or by contract.2 4 0 Such penalties
may include removal from office of officials who supported the illegal activity, so long as the real reason for the removal is the transgression of the union's legal commitments.2 41
The employer, too, has the right to discipline employees who
violate its rules.2 42 Moreover, although the employer may not fire
or otherwise discipline an employee because of participation in
238. "Concerted action" is used here to describe activity undertaken by or on behalf of
two or more workers, concerning terms or conditions of employment. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157, recognizes the right of workers to engage in
such activities. Section 8(a)(1) of that statute, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), forbids employers to
interfere, coerce or restrain employees in the exercise of § 7 rights. A strike is the most
obvious form of concerted action, but many other activities are also protected by the
statute.
239. The § 7 right to engage in concerted action may, at least to some extent, be waived
by the union in collective bargaining. Compare Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S.
270 (1956) with N.L.R.B. v. Magnavox Corp., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
240. See text & accompanying note 24 supra.
241. To the extent that removal from office would effectively limit an individual's ability to instigate such actions in the future or might be necessary to demonstrate the union's
disapproval of its agent's actions, thus avoiding liability for damages caused by the strike,
see note 249 infra, it might be appropriate for a union to remove officers without otherwise
punishing the remaining strikers.
242. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1980).

1981]

RANK-AND-FILE DISSENT

S707

concerted action for mutual aid or protection, 48 the employer may
impose discipline if the action violates a provision of a collective
bargaining agreement that clearly waives such legal protections.2 44
Both the courts and the NLRB view worker violations of contractual no-strike clauses as wholly unacceptable behavior which
threatens the national policy favoring peaceful resolution of labor
disputes.2 4 5 If the employees object to an action by their employer,
they are supposed to file a grievance and obtain resolution by an
arbitrator and not resort to economic muscle. 46 Accordingly, insofar as internal union disputes spill over into direct action in the
workplace, the law permits an employer to punish all participating
employees by suspending or even firing them.24
Although economic punishment is legally permissible, there
are practical constraints that limit both the employer and the
union. The union, for its part, is limited by the need to maintain
the loyalty of its own ranks. Unauthorized concerted action stems
in large part from members' perception that the union does not
recognize the importance of their concerns or intend to fight for
their interests. 2 48 If union officers take forceful action against the
strikers, they may well be regarded by the striking members as
having sided with management. 249 Failure to treat the conflict with
sufficient sensitivity may lead to the destruction of the overall
unity of the union's members and the substitution of ad hoc leaders for the leadership of the union.2 50 The result may even be the
prolongation of a wildcat strike.2 51
The employer, too, is limited in its reaction to unauthorized
concerted action. Although it may wish to deter future violations
by disciplining all those involved, the disciplinary action may itself
disrupt production, both by creating ill will among the employees
and decreasing the available workforce for the period of any sus243. See note 238 supra.
244. See note 239 supra.
245. Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235,' 247-53 (1970).
246. Gateway Coal Co. v. U.M.W.A., 414 U.S. 368, 377-79 (1974).
247. McLean Trucking Co., 71 L.R.R.M. 1051, 1057 (1969).
248. Atleson, supra note 79, at 758, 763-64; Flood, supra note 85, at 4, 8-9.
249. J. BARBASH, supra note 86; Sayles, supra note 83, at 44.
250. J. KUHN, supra note 15, at 83; L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 30, at 248;
Atleson, supra note 79, at 762.
251. Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 421-22 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
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pension.25 2 Yet merely selective discipline, such as punishing every
tenth striker, might not be a sufficient deterrent against future ille253
gal strikes.
Accordingly, employers have frequently sought to coerce the
unions which represent the workers into taking action which not
only ends the unlawful activity, but also spares the employers the
necessity of bearing the full brunt of the dissenting workers' anger.
Thus the employer may seek to require the union to discipline its
members for engaging in such conduct.2 5 One way to encourage
such union efforts is by bargaining for a clause in the collective
bargaining agreement that requires the union to take certain affirmative steps to prevent or terminate wildcat strikes, and then
holding the union financially responsible for damages caused by illegal concerted action.2 55 Alternately, the employer may simply adjust its wage offers to take into account the cost of the concerted
activity. The effect in either case is to ensure that the full union
membership has a financial incentive to dampen the ardor of factions which might be tempted to violate the contract.
B.

Direct Punishment of Union Officers by the Employer

Rather than rely on this indirect pressure, however, many employers have sought to single out the union leadership in the shop
for discipline. Such individuals wear two hats. They earn their living side by side with their fellow union members, working at their
trade and being paid by the employer. They are also agents for the
union and are thus working for their co-workers as well, although
by and large they are not paid for performing such duties.2 56 These
252.

Id. at 421.

253.

Management commonly believes that wildcat strikes and slowdowns can only be

avoided if employees understand in no uncertain terms that such actions will surely and
swiftly be punished. See, e.g., S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 682, 684 (1960).
254. SEIDMAN & LONDON, supra note 36, at 213.

255. If the union has not agreed to such a clause, then it may be held liable only if it
authorized the strike. Carbon Fuel Co. v. U.M.W.A., 444 U.S. 212 (1979). Under Eazor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976), a
union could be held liable for damages caused by breach of a no-strike clause, unless it used
all available means to terminate the strike once it began. This case, overruled by Carbon
Fuel, put enormous pressure on the union and its officers to discipline the strikers and
remove any officers supporting the strike. See United States Steel Corp. v. U.M.W.A., 519
F.2d 1249, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1975).

256.

A.

NASH,

supra note 70, at 6. The steward may, however, be paid "lost time" by
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officials, more than any others in the union, bear the full brunt of
pressures from both co-workers and the company concerning issues
57
faced in collective bargaining.
Pressures arise, in part, because the union officer's functions
include representing employees accused by supervisors of wrongdoing and confronting supervisors with employee protest. In this context they will frequently be called upon to disagree with or criticize
a supervisor, to suggest that a supervisor has not been entirely candid, to refuse an "order" to drop a grievance-conduct that might
be grounds for discipline in a different context.2 5s These pressures
are increased because the officer's dual status causes supervisors to
feel that the actions of a steward as such threaten supervisory authority over the steward as production worker. This status uncertainty may lead supervisors to try to exercise their normal moral
and economic authority as if a simple production question were
involved, thus hoping to psychologically undercut the officer's
259
equal status in bargaining.
Further pressures may arise from the employer's efforts to require the union officer to "set a good example" for other employees. Employers typically contend not only that the union and its
officers should "set a good example,

'20 °

but that they are subject to

an enforceable legal obligation to preserve the collective bargaining
agreement.26 ' When the union's officers are employed by the union
on a full-time basis, the employer cannot easily hold them personthe union, or may be permitted by the employer to leave his or her post without loss of pay

in order to meet with a foreman about a grievance or perform some other official duty.
HOWE & WIDICK, supra note 16, at 242-43; A. NASH, supra note 70, at 21-22, 32-33. To a
limited extent, a steward may also enjoy superseniority for lay-off purposes. N.L.R.B. v.
American Can Co., 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981); N.L.R.B. v. Teamsters Local 338, 531 F.2d
1162 (2d Cir. 1976).
257. The steward is often called "the man in the middle" for this reason. A. NASH,
supra note 70, at 9, 33; L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 30, at 83-98.
258. 0. PHELPS, DISCnLINE AND DISCHARGE IN THE: UNIONIZED FIRM 116-17 (1959).
259. See D. BEELER & H. KURSHENBAUM, supra note 30, at 24-27.
260. G. GARDINER, WHEN FOREMAN AND STEWARD BARGAIN 89-97 (1945). This position
cannot, however, be enforced by discipline. See, e.g., Owens Corning Fiberglass, 236
N.L.R.B. 479, 98 L.R.R.M. 1234, 1236-37 (1978) (employer committed unfair labor practice
by telling steward he was fired for failing to set an example for other employees with respect
to drinking at Christmas).
261.

W. CONNOLLY, WORK STOPPAGES AND UNION RESPONSIBILITY 286 (1977). Although

such officers usually are not the actual leaders of the actions, employers routinely single
them out as surrogates for the actual leaders, without analyzing the actual interactions
within the work group. Atleson, supra note 79, at 811-12.
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ally responsible for any failure to meet that obligation.2 2 The employer can, however, more easily impose work-related sanctions on
the shop leaders-normally stewards and grievance committee
members e 3 -who either participate in, or fail to take sufficient action to deter or terminate concerted action forbidden by the contract. The employer thus punishes the worker economically in his
capacity as an employee for conduct or omissions in his capacity as
a union official. This practice has been endorsed by most labor arbitrators, although not all.2 '
It may well be doubted whether such employer discipline will
in fact reduce the incidence of wildcat strikes, inasmuch as they
are often caused in the first place by members' belief that the
union officers are on management's side. The use of union powers
against wildcatters without sufficient sensitivity to this problem
could well increase this perception on the part of the rank-andfile. 65 Management discipline discourages union leaders from using their own expertise in union politics to prevent or contain wildcat strikes.
C. Collision of Direct Employer Punishment of Union Officials
and the Policies of the NLRA
The ability of an employer to discipline an employee in his
capacity as a union officer runs head-on into one of the most fundamental policies of the National Labor Relations Act-an employer may not discipline its workers to "encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. ' 266 Union "membership" is
a term of art that includes not only mere adherence to the organi262. A. NASH, supra note 70, at 42. Indeed, the absurdity of the argument that stewards
should be held personally responsible for wildcat strikes that they did not lead can be seen
by comparison with full-time union officials, who certainly could not be sued for damages
simply because the workers in the union violated a non-strike clause.
263. In many local unions, some or even all of the members of the executive board are
rank-and-file workers. In such instances, the employer may seek to discipline these individuals, too. See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1030, 105 L.R.R.M. 1487 (1980),
enf'd, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (June 14, 1982).
264. A. NASH, supra note 70, at 13; L. STESsIN, EMPLoYEE DISCIPLINE 211-28 (1960). But
see Mack Trucks, 41 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1240, 1244 (1964); Pittsburgh Std. Conduct, 33 Lab.
Arb. Rep. 807 (1959).

265. See text & accompanying notes 60-73 supra. See also K. Dix, C. FULLER, J. LINSKY
& C. ROBINSON, WORK STOPPAGES AND THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE IN THE APPALACHIAN COAL
INDUSTRY 55 (West Va. U. Institute for Labor Studies).
266. Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
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zation, but also extends to an employee's choice to be active or
passive in union activities; to be a leader or a follower, or neither
one. 26 7 In particular, service as a union official embodies "the essence of protected concerted activities;"2 68 hence an employer may
not discriminate against employees by reason of their union office.
1. The Precision Castings rule. Thus, the National Labor Relations Board has ruled in several cases, beginning with Precision
Castings Co. 269 that an employer may not single out for particularly severe discipline a union officer who participates in unlawful
concerted activity.2 7 0 This rule against disparate discipline does
not condone unlawful activity on the part of union officers; it only
assures employees that they will not be worse off by reason of their
27 1
protected activity.
Until PrecisionCastings, the Board's rulings in this area had
been unclear. One commentator, after a detailed examination of

the Board's decisions before and after Precision Castings,has concluded that the Board has consistently applied a rule pursuant to

which an employer may single out union officers if the contract
expressly so permits, but otherwise may single out an officer only
if, in the context of a steward's leadership status in other matters,

the steward's conduct during a wildcat strike amounts to leadership or encouragement of the strike. 27- This reading of the Board's
267. Radio Officers Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17 (1954); N.L.R.B. v. Milk Drivers &
Dairy Emp., Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976).
268. General Motors Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. 472, 477, 89 L.R.R.M. 1891 (1975), enf'd, 535
F.2d 1246 (3d Cir. 1976).
269. 233 N.L.R.B. 183, 96 L.R.R.M. 1540 (1970).
270. Teamsters Local 20 v. N.L.R.B., 610 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1979); N.L.R.B. v. Gates
Rubber Co., 493 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1974); Cameron Iron Works v. N.L.R.B., 464 F.2d 609
(5th Cir. 1972).
271. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 1164, 106 L.R.R.M. 1164 (1981), enf.
pending, (5th Cir. No. 81-1164); Metropolitan Edison Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1030, 105 L.R.R.M.
1487 (1980), enfd, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (June 14,
1982); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. 982, 105 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1980), enf. denied sub.
noa. Fournelle v. N.L.R.B., 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982); C.H. Heist, 250 N.L.R.B. 1400,
105 L.R.R.M. 1061 (1980), enf'd, 108 L.R.R.M. 2159 (7th Cir. 1981); Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 243 N.L.R.B. 306, 101 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1979), enf'd sub nom., IUE v. N.L.R.B., nos.
79-1707 and 79-1862 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 99 L.R.R.M. 1059
(1978), enf. denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979); Precision Castings Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 183, 96
L.R.R.M. 1540 (1977).
272. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1976).
273. Rummage, Union Officers and Wildcat Strikes: Freedom from Discriminatory
Discipline, 4 INDUs. REL. L. J. 258, 262-79 (1981).
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decisions seems strained, both for the cases before 27 4 and after Precision Castings. 5 It is clear only that the Board will allow employers to single out for extra discipline those officers who lead or
encourage wildcat strikes.278 In any event, the Board has explained
in some detail the reasons for its current rule, even if it has never
277
sought to reconcile or overrule the earlier cases.

2. Judicialresponse to Precision Castings. Early court of appeals decisions reviewing Precision Castings were not receptive to
its rule. In Indiana & Michigan Electric v. N.L.R.B., 27 ' the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the rule on
the ground that because union officers have higher responsibilities
than rank-and-file employees they deserve different treatment, and
it is not "discrimination" to single them out. 27 9 The Third Circuit

adopted this reasoning in Gould v. N.L.R.B., 8 ° where it quoted extensively from Indiana & Michigan Electric, but ultimately relied
principally upon the fact that the collective bargaining agreement
spelled out detailed steps for stewards to take during wildcat
strikes. Because the steward, but not other employees, had violated
that particular clause, it was appropriate to impose different pun274. For example, in Russell Packing Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 194, 48 L.R.R.M. 1608 (1961),
an assistant shop steward violated work rules by leaving the assembly line to handle a grievance. When the assistant left, all other workers ceased production. Thereafter, the chief
steward first told the other workers to begin work again; when that failed, he left to help the
assistant steward solve the grievance so work could begin again. Rummage speculates that
"the Board's analysis could be characterized as based upon the inducement effect of the
chief steward's action." Rummage, supra note 273 at 266. Yet that analysis does not appear
in the Board's opinion; rather, Rummage shows only that the factual pattern is arguably
consistent with the Board's later decisions.
275. For example, Runimage writes of Precision Castings,"absent an explicit waiver [of
§ 8(a)(3) protection] the Board stated that a union officer could not 'be held to a greater
degree of accountability for participating in the strike.'" Id. at 269. In fact, the Board did
not limit its holding to the narrow situation where there has been no waiver; at most, Rummage shows that the factual situation would be consistent with a later decision allowing
such a waiver, if the Board elects so to rule. Indeed, Board counsel have expressly stated, in
response to questions from panels before whom they have argued, that they lack authority
to advise the court that the Board has so limited its rulings.
276. Midwest Precision Castings, 244 N.L.R.B. 597, 102 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1979).
277. Metropolitan Edison Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1030, 105 L.R.R.M. 1487 (1980), enf'd,
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3982 (June 14, 1982).
278. 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979).
279. Id.
280. 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied on other grounds sub nom., Moran v.
Gould Corp., 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
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ishment on him.2 ' In N.L.R.B. v. Armour-Dial2 82 although the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement of a
Precision Castings order on substantial evidence grounds, 2 3 it

nevertheless denounced the Board's doctrine in extended dicta.
It is difficult to understand the vehemence with which these

early cases rejected the Board's rule,284 because the arguments on
which they are based are singularly unpersuasive. Opponents of
the Board's rule argue that disparate discipline imposed in such
situations is not intended to discourage workers from taking union
office, but only to prevent them from joining illegal strikes for
28 5
which union officers, like any other employee, can be disciplined.
It is also argued that union officers have a greater responsibility
than other workers to ensure that the collective bargaining agreement is obeyed and therefore merit greater punishment when they
flout the agreement.288 Finally, it is said that union officers in the
shop receive a bundle of "benefits and protections" not given to
other employees; if it is appropriate to so discriminate in their

favor, then it should be lawful to impose concomitantly adverse
discriminatory rules.287

Yet these contentions could equally be applied to a union activist who stole property, fought or loafed on the job, or violated
any explicit or implicit shop rule. And the fact that an employee
may have loafed, fought or stolen will not excuse discipline that
was actually imposed because of union membership or activity.2 88
281. Id.
282. 638 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1981).
283. Id. at 55-56.
284. In a case decided by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit after Precision
Castings, but reviewing a Board order issued before PrecisionCastings,the court ruled that
a union steward could be fired for filing grievances with government agencies in the face of a
contract which required submission of all grievances to a joint employer-union committee,
and which forbade stewards to exceed their authority. N.L.R.B. v. Wilson Freight Co., 604
F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub. nom., Smith v. Wilson Freight Co., 445 U.S. 962
(1980). Another court has affirmed a Precision Castings order by unwritten opinion; although examination of the briefs suggests that the court may have simply decided that the
officers did not participate in the strike, Judge MacKinnon's strong dissent suggests that the
majority necessarily decided the Precision Castings issue as well: I.U.E. v. N.L.R.B., Nos.
79-1707 and 79-1862 (D.C. Cir., December 5, 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
285. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Armour-Dial, 638 F.2d 51, 55 (8th Cir. 1981).
286. See, e.g., Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 599 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1979).
287. See, e.g., Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 884, 99 L.R.R.M. 1059, 1062 (1978)
(Penello, dissenting) (emphasis deleted), enf. denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979).
288. Food Store Employees Local 347 v. N.L.R.B., 418 F.2d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
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The very nature of the steward's job leads to frequent confrontations with the employer on behalf of other employees. 28 9 If workers
perceive that holding union office lawfully exposes one to greater
employer discipline, they will naturally be discouraged from assuming union office.2 90
The assumption underlying the "greater responsibility" argument may be that the no-strike clause, as the foundation of the
grievance arbitration system which is basic to the national labor
policy, 29 1 is so much more important than any other employer rule
that an exception to the anti-discrimination rule is justified. Yet
the strike situation is also special from the worker's vantage
point-a union leader's refusal to honor his constituents' decision
to break that rule will likely be greeted with outrage.29 2 "Scabbing"
is generally deemed the greatest possible offense against the workers' solidarity; it easily amounts to political suicide and, ultimately,
the breakdown of authority within the union.2 9 3 This would be in
the interest of neither the employer nor the union.
A second answer to the objections to PrecisionCastings is that
a union officer can acquire a responsibility to ensure compliance
with the contract only if the union has so agreed.2 Even assuming
that a greater responsibility can lawfully be imposed on individual
union officers-an issue discussed in Part D2 5 -- the mere existence
of a no-strike clause is not sufficient to impose such an obligation,
even on the union.2 9 6 A union officer cannot be so obligated in the
Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 414 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir. 1969).
289. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Clayton Constr. Co., 652 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1981).
290. The conflicting pressures on stewards, coupled with the lower level of rewards for
holding the office, have made it difficult for many unions to recruit members to do the job.
J. KUHN, supra note 15, at 120; L. SAYLES & G. STRAuss, supra note 30, at 34-42. See also
Szewczuga v. N.L.R.B., Nos. 81-1054, 81-1413 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 1982), slip op. at 23 (in
light of selective discharge of two stewards, another steward resigned, and union has been
unable to fill the three positions).
291. Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960); 29 U.S.C. §
173(d).
292. See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 663 F.2d 478, 482 n.3 & accompanying text (3d Cir. 1981).
293. Id.; C.H. Heist Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 657 F.2d 178, 183 (7th Cir. 1981).
294. Hammermill Paper Co. v. N.L.R.B., 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981); C.H. Heist Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981).
295. See text accompanying notes 330-65 infra.
296. Carbon Fuel Co. v. U.M.W.A., 444 U.S. 212 (1979). Although the facts of this decision pertained to liability of the international union and one of its districts, it has been
applied to suits against locals as well. See, e.g., Lakeshore Motor Freight v. Teamsters, 483
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absence of a clause imposing specific responsibilities on the employee in his capacity as a union officer.29 7 And, in order to be enforced, such
a clause must clearly be intended to impose such
liability. 2 8
Even if the union has agreed to take affirmative steps to prevent certain violations of the contract, such a clause does not necessarily permit an employer to punish a union officer personally.
Because the employer's claim against the officer is based in contract, not tort, the usual tort rule that both agent and principal are
liable for the agent's conduct does not apply.2 99 To the contrary, an
agent cannot be held liable for the failure of his or her principal to
comply with its contractual obligations even if the principal assigns
the task to the agent. 00 The agent is presumed not to be personally bound and liability cannot be imposed unless the agent has
clearly expressed an intention to be bound.301 These common law
rules of agency are applicable to the National Labor Relations
30 2
Act.
Accordingly, the more recent cases have generally upheld the
Board's rulings, albeit by different reasoning.3 0 3 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, while not expressly disavowing its
F. Supp. 1150 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
297. This appears to have been the basis for the decision in Gould, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 612
F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979). There the contract specified not only that there could be no strikes
during the term of the agreement, but also that in the event of such a strike, the union's
"officers shall immediately take positive and evident steps to have those involved cease such
activities" and spelled out in detail the steps that were to be taken. In Hammermill Paper
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981), Judge Higginbotham stated that the contract
would have to be at least this specific before disparate discipline would be permitted. Judge

Rosenn, on the other hand, would have accepted a clause which could have been construed
as imposing affirmative duties, without being so specific.

298. Rigler, Union Liability for Wildcat Strikes: A Look at Carbon Fuel, 33 ME. L.
1, 12 (1981).

REV.

299.

Compare H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND

PARTNERSHIP §

300.

118 (1979) with id. § 124.

Shilman v. United States, 164 F.2d 649, 650 (2d Cir. 1948);

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA

OF CORPORATIONS § 1118 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 328 (1958).

301. See, e.g., Lake City Stevedores v. East West Shipping Agency, 474 F.2d 1060, 1063
(5th Cir. 1973).
302.

Carbon Fuel Co. v. U.M.W.A., 444 U.S. 212 (1979).

303. In Fournelle v. N.L.R.B., 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the court found that the
collective bargaining agreement authorized more severe punishment of union officers, and so
declined to address the propriety of disparate treatment in the absence of a waiver. In
Szewczuga v. N.L.R.B., Nos. 81-1054, 81-1413 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 1982), slip op. at 23-24 and
n.84, the court agreed that disparate discipline is unlawful unless the officer's rights have
been waived in "the collective bargaining process."
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earlier decision, 304 construed it narrowly in C.H. Heist Corp. v.
N.L.R.B 30 5 to permit the imposition of disparate punishment on

union officers only pursuant to a "clear contractual provision." 300
That court reasoned that although the discipline was not the product of anti-union motivation, it was inherently destructive of important employee rights, and therefore unlawful.307
Similarly, in MetropolitanEdison Co. v. N.L.R.B.30 8 the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit made explicit the limitation implicit in Gould v. N.L.R.B., 09 ruling that only an express waiver of
the right against disparate discipline of a union officer will suffice
to render such discipline lawful.3 10 Indeed, Chief Judge Seitz
spelled out the kind of language which allows an employer to require officers to undertake specific steps and which only allows employers to require a good faith effort to end the strike. 1 However,
this court found it unnecessary to rely upon an "inherently destructive" rationale, as in C.H. Heist Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,1 2 ruling
simply that absent waiver, disparate discipline of a steward is discriminatory and unlawful. 3
Judge Seitz' reasoning seems more appropriate. The "inherently destructive" rationale is derived from N.L.R.B. v. Great
Dane Trailers,14 according to which an unfair labor practice has
been committed either when the employer acts with anti-union animus or when the action is inherently destructive of important employee rights.3

15

The requisite "anti-union" animus, however, is

equivalent to "anti-union membership or activity;"316 an act pursuant to such animus is unlawful even if the employer is in no other
way anti-union. Thus, the fact that the employer sincerely be304. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 559 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979).
305.

657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981).

306. Id. at 183.
307. Id. at 182-83.
308. 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981).
309. 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979).
310. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 663 F.2d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1981). See also
Hanmermill Paper Co. v. N.L.R.B., 658 F.2d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 1981) (per J. Higginbotham).
311. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 663 F.2d 478, 481-82 (3d Cir. 1981).
312. 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981).
313. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 663 F.2d 478, 482 (3d Cir. 1981).
314. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
315. Id. at 34.
316. Radio Officers Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1954).
317. Alabama Roofing & Metal Co. v. N.L.R.B., 331 F.2d 965, 967 (5th Cir. 1964).
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lieves in its own rectitude and is not trying to destroy the union
but simply to further its own business, does not legitimize its use
of a protected activity (holding union office) as a surrogate for the
unprotected activity (strike leadership) which it seeks to punish.
Because the propriety of disparate punishment turns on
whether the collective bargaining agreement permits it by imposing higher duties on union officers than it does on other employees,
the employer's defense is that the contract waives the protection of
section 8(a)(3), and the Board's waiver doctrine is applicable. 1s
That is to say, the employer must point to language showing a
clear and unmistakable waiver of the statutory right,3 19 so that it is
clear that the union has fully discussed and consciously yielded the
right.32 0 As noted above, the recent cases have applied the rule requiring contractual language for a waiver of the right against disparate punishment for union officers. 21
The "benefits and protections" argument against Precision
Castings founders completely on the requirement of express
waiver. Insofar as the argument rests on union stewards' alleged
greater protection from employer discipline, it is simply incorrect.3 22 The cases holding that the Board will look askance at the
discipline of union stewards for insubordination or using harsh language with supervisors do not confer on stewards rights not shared
by other employees. The insubordination cases stand only for the
proposition that when a steward is pressing a grievance, he is not
doing work for the employer and so need not obey an order to drop
the grievance 23 The harsh language cases rely on the fact that the
words are concerted action, unlike the use of profanity in response
to an order to speed up work. 24 The fact that the employee makes
318. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963).
319. Id. See also N.L.R.B. v. Perkins Machine Co., 326 F.2d 488, 489 (1st Cir. 1964).
320. New York Mirror, 151 N.L.R.B. 834, 58 L.R.R.M. 1465, 1467 (1965); Press Co., 121
N.L.R.B. 976, 42 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1958).
321. See text & accompanying notes 304-13 supra; see also Pioneer Finishing Corp. v.
N.L.R.B, 667 F.2d 199, 203-04 (1st Cir. 1981).
322. When N.L.R.B. Member Penello advanced this argument in dissenting from the
Board's PrecisionCastings rulings, he cited cases to this effect. See, e.g., Gould Corp., 237
N.L.R.B. 881, 99 L.R.R.M. 1059, 1062 (1978), enf. denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979).
323. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv., 252 N.L.R.B. 624, 105 L.R.R.M. 1308, 1310
(1980); Pittsburgh Press Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 408, 97 L.R.R.M. 1371, 1372 (1978).
324. See, e.g., Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. 322, 71 L.R.R.M. 1418,
1419 n.4 (1969), enf'd, 430 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1970); Thor Power Tool Co., 148 N.L.R.B.
1379, 57 L.R.R.M. 1161 (1964), enf'd, 351 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965).
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statements as an individual, or as a representative of other employees, is immaterial. 2
Underlying the "benefits and protections" argument is also
the analogy to the Board rule permitting a limited seniority preference for recall purposes for union officers involved in administration of the contract.3 2 However, these rules tend to be fairly specifically outlined, with the protections strictly delimited, in
collective bargaining agreements. The "greater responsibility" of
union officers in wildcat strike situations, on the other hand, tends
not to be specified in the collective bargaining agreement, and so
the analogy to Board treatment of seniority preferences cannot
give rise to a valid objection to the Precision Castings rule.
3. The effect of arbitralconstruction of the contract. The fact
that arbitrators have by and large upheld disparate discipline
means that employers will commonly raise such decisions as a defense, either because the particular discipline has been upheld by
the arbitrator on such grounds, 27 or because similar discipline has
previously been upheld. 28
It is argued that the arbitrator's construction of the collective
bargaining agreement is an authoritative statement of the rights
and obligations of the parties which both the courts and the NLRB
are bound to follow, as much as if the construction were written
into the collective bargaining agreement. If the parties could not
rely on arbitral constructions, the "whole function of arbitration
325. F.W.Woolworth Co. v. N.L.R.B., 655 F.2d 151, 154 (8th Cir. 1981) (insubordination); Bettcher Mfg. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 526, 21 L.R.R.M. 1222, 1223 (1948) (harsh language).
See also N.L.R.B. v. Lummus Indus., 679 F.2d 229 (11th Cir. 1982) (harsh language used by
union dissident).
326. This argument is explicitly advanced by Member Penello in Gould Corp., 237
N.L.R.B. 881, 99 L.R.R.M. 1059, 1062 (1978), enf. denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979).
327. This may also raise questions of the propriety of Board deferral to arbitration in
particular cases. But see Comment, JudicialReview and the Trend Toward More Stringent
N.L.R.B. Standards on Arbitral Deferrals, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 738 (1981); see also Levy,
Recent Developments in Deferral to Arbitration, 2 LAB. UPDATE No. 2, at 6-7 (1981) (suggesting that deferral may be inappropriate in individual rights cases). The arbitrator's reliance on an improper standard to determine the propriety of a discharge would render the
decision clearly repugnant to the policies and purposes of the statute under the principles of
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955). See Alfred M. Lewis v.
N.L.R.B., 587 F.2d 403, 407-08 (9th Cir. 1978). Thus, the fact that the arbitration upon
which the employer relies involved the same facts as the case before the N.L.R.B. does not
call for a different result from the case where the arbitration is cited as precedent.
328. See, e.g., Fournelle v. N.L.R.B., 670 F.2d 331,345 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding waiver);
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 663 F.2d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding no waiver).
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'
would be impaired."329
This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, arbitration
serves a different function from that of the Board.33 0 The arbitrator interprets the collective bargaining agreement, in light of the
law of the shop or other matters, without any presumptions for or
against a waiver. The Board, on the other hand, looks to see
whether there has been a clear and unmistakable waiver. If the
contract is ambiguous, thus requiring an arbitral construction,
there has been no waiver.3 31 When the Board applies the waiver
doctrine it does not purport to determine the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement. It only goes so far as necessary to determine whether the union has surrendered important statutory
3 32
safeguards.
The second argument, that application of the waiver standard
would disrupt the arbitral function by encouraging the Board and
the courts to engage in second-guessing of arbitrators' construction
of collective bargaining agreements, is substantially overdrawn. Arbitral awards will continue to have precedential effect concerning
economic issues between the parties. If, however, a party wishes to
convert an arbitral decision into a waiver of the statutory right
against discrimination that encourages or discourages union membership or activity, then it must seek such a waiver openly. This
requirement does not subvert the collective bargaining agreement;
it simply ensures that statutory rights-the basis upon which a collective bargaining relationship is built-will not be undermined
sub silentio.
It may well be that, even as a simple question of contractual
interpretation, an arbitral ruling that a plain no-strike clause imposes affirmative obligations on the union would be contrary to
law, inasmuch as the Supreme Court has determined, in Carbon
Fuel Co. v. U.M.W.A., 333 that such a clause does not, without more,
imply affirmative obligations.3 3 In any event, arbitral interpretaS..

329. Fournelle v. N.L.R.B., 670 F.2d 331, 344-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982). An arbitral decision
will not be given the effect of waiving statutory rights unless it clearly imposes higher duties
on union officers and finds those duties to be based in the contract. Szewczuga v. N.L.R.B.,
Nos. 81-1054, 81-1413 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 1982), slip op. at 15.
330. See N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437-38 (1967).
331. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
332. N.L.R.B. v. C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. 421, 428 (1967).
333. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
334. Id.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

tions are not binding on the courts,3 5 and their significance for the
waiver determination is weakened by the different standard
applied."' 8
Under this standard, union officials may not be singled out for
more discipline than other participants in a wildcat strike absent
clear language in the collective bargaining agreement showing that
the union has agreed to it. Even then, the employer's authority is
limited to that expressly given by the contract. If the employer
wishes union leaders to follow a particular course during a wildcat
strike, the specific actions must be spelled out in the contract. Absent such specificity, the employer can impose discipline only for a
bad faith violation of the higher responsibility clause. 37
D. Propriety of Contractual Waivers
Once it is accepted that union officers are protected against
discriminatory discipline by the employer for unauthorized concerted action, the question naturally arises whether that protection
can be waived. The framework for analysis is provided by the Supreme Court's decision in N.L.R.B. v. Magnavox Corp.338 That case
presented the question whether the section 7 right to distribute
literature or to solicit union memberships 339 could be waived by
the union in the bargaining process. Building upon the distinction
between waiver of the right to strike against employer violations of
employees' statutory rights and waiver of the right to strike for
economic gain during collective bargaining,4 0 the Court concluded
that the right to choose a collective bargaining representative is
not one that unions should be permitted to surrender. The Court
also observed that when there is a conflict of interest between the
union's desire to maintain the status quo and the employee's possible desire to effectuate a change in collective bargaining representatives, "the premise of fair representation" does not support the
335.

Metropolitan Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 663 F.2d 478, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1981).

336.

None of the arbitral decisions the author has seen apply a waiver standard.

337.

Metropolitan Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 663 F.2d 478, 481-82 (3d Cir. 1981).

338.

415 U.S. 322 (1974).

339.

Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793 (1956).

340. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270 (1956). This decision recognized
the lawfulness of a waiver of the § 7 right to take concerted economic action. It did not
sanction waiver of the right, guaranteed by § 8(a)(3), to decide to be active, to be passive, or
to refrain from membership in a union.
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union's power to negotiate away employee rights.3 41
Because unauthorized concerted activity generally arises from
internal union conflict over collective bargaining strategy,3 42 a
union's attempted waiver of the right against discrimination
against persons who choose to hold union office runs afoul of both
Magnavox criteria. First, the interest of the union as a whole is
decidedly in conflict with those factions within the union that may
wish to engage in unauthorized concerted action. 43 Such activity
not only threatens the union's collective bargaining strategy, but
may lead to the union's being held liable on an agency theory for
having authorized the strike.3 4 4
Moreover, as we have seen, the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements normally takes place at a level of the union
well removed from the shop floor, and it is conducted by officers
who may be not only estranged from rank-and-file sentiment, but
also ill disposed to receipt of indications contrary to their perspectives.3 45 The representatives directly accountable to the rank-andfile, who will need to communicate their members' sentiments in
order to perform their functions properly,3 46 may well come to be
regarded by the top officers as part of the problem.
Thus, the union may be tempted to kill two birds with one
stone, both authorizing the employer to handle an internal disciplinary problem that is beyond its effective control 3 4 and buying an
immunity from damages by waiving its officers' rights against employer discrimination. 348 And, in fact, it is not uncommon for union
341. 415 U.S. at 325.
342. See Part II supra. Although some wildcat strikes may originate in a union leader's
desire to use unlawful means to increase the union's credibility in bargaining, the great majority stem from workers' belief that, for one reason or another, the union leadership cannot
be relied upon for attention to their problems. Atleson, supra note 79, at 756-58.
343. See text & accompanying notes 81-87 supra. Indeed, because union officers are,
politically unable in many instances to maintain discipline internally, they may instead ac-

quiesce in employer sanctions as a means of taking themselves off the hook. Atleson, supra
note 79, at 810.
344.

Kerry Coal Co. v. U.M.W.A., 637 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1981).

345. See text & accompanying notes 294-98 supra.
346. See text & accompanying notes 304-07 supra.
347. This appears to have been the origin of such employer discipline in the automobile
industry. HOWE & WIDICK, supra note 16, at 240-41.
348. In Wilson Freight Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 844, 97 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1978), rev'd, 604 F.2d

712 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1979), an industrial relations officer testified
that this was the purpose of Article 41 of the New England Supplement to the National

Master Freight Agreement. Tr. 264. Indeed, one commentator has argued that it is tactically
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leaders to work together with management to ensure "amicable"
relations by eliminating "troublemakers" from union positions.3 41

Second, it is important to recall that a collective bargaining
representative can act only through union leaders. If a union can
waive the right of employees not to be subject to discipline based
on their holding union office and can authorize the employer to
discharge any employee whose internal union activities do not conform to the wishes of the union's top leadership, 350 then the effec-

tiveness of the employees' right to choose their bargaining representative is significantly reduced. Thus, Magnavox has been held
to bar waiver of the rights involved in selecting union leadership,
such as distributing literature pertaining to candidacy for union
office.35 1 Similarly, although not discussing the problem from a
waiver perspective, cases that forbid an employer to discharge an
employee at the request of the union3 52 because of his or her union
activities lend further support to the conclusion that a union may
not authorize an employer to single out a union officer for
discipline. 53
It is certainly true, as the court of appeals observed in Gould
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 5 that an employer is entitled to designate by
name particular individuals who are responsible for enforcing the
collective bargaining agreement. 5 5 Even more expansive reasoning
was employed in Wilson FreightCo. v. N.L.R.B.,35 1 where the court
a mistake for management to pursue remedies against international unions, because that
might deter unions from agreeing to no-strike clauses. Instead, management should emphasize remedies against individuals. Note, Wildcat Strikes and the Need for an Enforceable
Damages Remedy, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 493.
349. Atleson, supra note 79, at 810.
350. To the contrary, however, the only obligation to a union that may be enforced by
discharge is the failure to pay dues. N.L.R.B. v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743
(1963). The Supreme Court has never held that § 8(a)(3) rights may be waived.
351. General Motors Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 512 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1975).
352. See, e.g., Fruin-Colnon Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 571 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1978); Rust Engineering Co. v. NL.R.B., 445 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1971).
353. The transcripts of N.L.R.B. hearings concerning employer discipline of union officers for unauthorized concerted activity typically reveal that the punishment was imposed
against a background of factional disputes within the union. See, e.g., Wilson Freight Co.,
Docket No. 1-CA-12355 (N.L.R.B.), Tr. 47-50, 70, 87, 95-97; Bethlehem Steel Corp., Docket
No. 5-CA-9720 (N.L.R.B.), Tr. 77, 141. Unable to subjugate their rivals internally, the union
leaders acquiesce in discipline by the employer, and even testify on its behalf at the hearing.
See also text & accompanying notes 342-44 supra.
354. 612 F.2d 728 (3rd Cir. 1979).
355. Id. at 733.
356. 604 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1979).
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stated that the collective bargaining agreement not only limits, but
indeed creates, the shop steward's role and authority. The court
drew an analogy to the ability of a bank to decide how much
check-signing authority its officers have and to fire them for using
their authority improperly.3 57 And, indeed, some employers have
sought the authority to discipline union officers who tried and
as if their performance were subject
failed to end a wildcat strike
3 58
to the employer's direction.
It is also true that the grievance procedure is a creature of the
collective bargaining agreement and that the employer's responsibility to bargain with a particular individual once that person has
filed a grievance is also a function of the contract. Nevertheless, a
union's stewards and other officials do not function on behalf of
the employer, as does a bank's officer on behalf of the bank. 5 9 To
the contrary, management has a separate class of personnel-supervisors and industrial relations officers-with whom
stewards and other union officers deal as adversaries on behalf of
the union membership. Thus, the right of a bank to punish an employee for poorly performing his or her loan approval duties provides no support for an employer's punishment of a steward.
Similarly, it does not necessarily follow from the employer's
right to appoint a class of persons who will enforce the contract
that it is unobjectionable for the employer to designate all union
officers, regardless of rank, as the class of persons who will carry
out this task. Enforcing the contract is the task of a supervisor.3 60
Management, of course, typically tries to persuade the union
and its agents to collaborate in enforcing its industrial relations
system.3 6 " That effort is facilitated by the process of creating a
357.

Id. at 725-28.

358.

L. STESSIN, supra note 264, at 224-25.

359. United Steelworkers v. Lorain, 616 F.2d 919, 921 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 2313. See also United States Postal Serv., 258 N.L.R.B. No. 193, 108 L.R.R.M. 1201,
1202 (1981) (employer may not dictate manner in which union steward performs duties, by
ordering him to provide representation at proposed disciplinary interview).
360. Section 2(11) of the NATIONAL LABOR RELAvIONs AcT, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11), defines
"supervisor" as:
to disany individual having authority, in the interest of the employer ....
charge ... reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them,
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
361. D. BEELER & H. KURSHENBAUM, supra note 30, at 70-73; R. EDWARDS, supra note
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contract which is legally binding for a given period of time-the

union inevitably assumes a position of deciding that certain disputes are foreclosed by the contract.362 The national labor policy,
however, has traditionally depended on a responsible adversary
system, in which supervisors represent the employer's interests and
the union and its officers represent the employees' interests and

decide independently what those interests are and how they may
best be achieved.363 Under the NLRA,361 the union's internal decision-making process must be "free . . .from all taint of an employer's compulsion, domination or influence."36 5 Although management retains the right to enforce the collective bargaining

agreement, it may not control the discrete actions of union officers
in a manner which would compromise the independence of the

union. 66 This principle requires that a strict separation be maintained between management and union leadership functions-for
example, supervisors may not function as union officers.3 67 Indeed,
if a worker is given even one of the supervisory powers enumerated
in the statute, that is sufficient to make that worker a supervisor

who is thus disqualified from union office, 368 even if the power is
only infrequently exercised.36 9

Thus, by imposing upon the class of union officers a duty, enforceable by the employer, to prevent unauthorized concerted activity or otherwise to ensure compliance with the contract, an em29, at 132; LESTER, supra note 18, at 121; WIDICK, supra note 30, at 86. Management training materials urge that such efforts be undertaken. See, e.g., G. GARDINER, supra note 260,
at 83-87, 90-92, 105-18. See also Bell, The Racket-Ridden Longshoremen, in LABOR AND
TRADE UNIONISM 246 (W. Galenson & S. Lipset eds. 1960) (shipping industry, among others,
uses racketeer control of unions to bring order to labor and product markets).

362. C.

GERSUNY, PUNISHMENT AND REDRESS IN A MODERN FACTORY

76 (1973); Burawoy,

Americanism and Fordism: Labor and Politics in Britain and the United States 25-29,
paper presented at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
363. See A. KORNHAUSER, R. DUBIN & A. Ross, INDUSTRIAL CONFLIC'r 18-20 (1954). As
the N.L.R.B. said in the leading case of Nassau & Suffolk Contractors Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B.
174, 40 L.R.R.M. 1146, 1151 (1957): "Employees have the right to be represented in collective bargaining negotiation by individuals who have a single-minded loyalty to their interests." Id. (emphasis deleted).
364. Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
365. Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72, 80 (1940).
366. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 50 U.S.L.W. 4975, 4979-80 (June
29, 1982).
367. I.T.T. Arctic Servs., 238 N.L.R.B. 116, 99 L.R.R.M. 1659 (1978).
368. Wine & Liquor Salesmen Local 195 v. N.L.R.B., 452 F.2d 1312, 1318 (D.C. Cir.
1971). The relevant portion of § 2(11) is set forth at note 360 supra.
369. American Diversified Foods v. N.L.R.B., 640 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1981).
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ployer would run afoul of the very foundation of national labor
policy. 370 Moreover, the very nature of the problem at which this
rule is directed-union acquiescence in employer interferit inappropriate for a union to waive the application
ence-makes
3 71
of the rule.
In summary, insofar as the union may, for its own purposes,
discipline an officer for a failure to use leadership to prevent or
terminate an unlawful concerted action or, indeed, for engaging in
the concerted action, it will be acting within its prerogatives. If, on
the other hand, the employer seeks to impose such discipline, it in
effect seeks to usurp the right to control the performance of union
officers which properly resides in the membership. Nor can a union
in collective bargaining agree to turn over to the employer its disciplinary powers. Such a clause would not only be an impermissible
waiver of the right against discrimination, but would also give the
employer the ability to intervene in union government, a practice
expressly forbidden by law.
CONCLUSION

In recent decades union governments have tended to become
centralized bureaucracies. More so than ever, rank-and-file agitation is the key to keeping the interests of the workers, rather than
of union leaders, paramount. Legal protections are, of course, no
substitute for activism. However, by protecting the rights of union
officers to aggressively advance the interests of their constituents,
the law can help union members maintain greater control over
their unions.
In the short run, protecting the rights of union officers may
increase the level of direct confrontation between unions and management, inasmuch as unions may make higher demands on management in collective bargaining. However, the elevation of rankand-file dissatisfaction to the level of official union policy will permit the parties to address the merits of members' complaints and
hopefully to reach a resolution. So long as the parties content
themselves with punishing the messengers of member dissatisfac370. "[T]his is a crucial area of labor law and ...

care must be taken to avoid any

possibility of abuse." Mon River Towing v. N.L.R.B., 421 F.2d 1, 8 (3d Cir. 1969).

371. It is frequently the union which is aggrieved by orders issued by the N.L.R.B.
pursuant to § 8(a)(2) and which therefore petitions for review of the orders. See, e.g., Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
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tion, such dissatisfaction will continue. Moreover, there is an independent national interest in assuring that workers gain self-expression through their unions, even if there is a price to be paid in
labor unrest.
Although internal union controversies may spill over into concerted action directed at employers, unions should be required to
correct internally any missteps by their officers, rather than turning the disciplinary problem over to the employers. And, so long as
officers' actions are directed to their unions' own decision-making,
the officers should be protected against discipline by the union.

